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I. INTRODUCTION
A decade has passed since the 1992 United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the
Earth Summit. At the Earth Summit, more than 170 governments,
including 102 heads of state, agreed that the current course of de-
velopment is unsustainable, because it damages ecosystems on
which all peoples depend, and deepens economic disparities be-
tween and within nations. With considerable fanfare, govern-
ments declared that "[h]umanity stands at a defining moment in
history," and pledged to change course. They announced a"global consensus and political commitment at the highest level"1
* Assistant Professor of Law and Political Science, The City University of New York,
Queens College and School of Law.
1. Agenda 21, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26/Rev.1 (1992). At the time, this was the
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to an international partnership to achieve sustainable develop-
ment. At the core of the consensus was recognition that human
beings are at the center of concerns for development, and envi-
ronmental protection is an integral part of the development proc-
ess. 2
The Earth Summit resulted in a suite of documents, including
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Decla-
ration), a proclamation of principles to guide sustainable devel-
opment, and Agenda 21, a 472-page blueprint to achieve it. Al-
though not legally binding, they represent international consensus
and, purportedly, a high level of political commitment for imple-
mentation at the national level.3
This article examines progress towards sustainable develop-
ment in Amazonia, in areas where international corporations
carry out industrial operations to find and extract nonrenewable
natural resources in territories that are occupied by indigenous
peoples. This type of development is common in indigenous
communities around the world; in Ecuador and some other loca-
tions in Amazonia, it is the primary engine of national and inter-
national development activities.
Industrial natural resources development is characterized by a
major industrial undertaking, extending over a substantial period
of time, with significant environmental consequences. Especially
in the petroleum sector, the operations commonly expand-
incrementally but repeatedly-into new areas. National govern-
ments invite, permit and receive revenues from the operations,
but indigenous peoples who live in the resource-rich lands gener-
largest gathering of heads of state in the history of nation-states.
2. This represented a significant development since the 1972 Stockholm Conference on
the Human Environment, where governments debated whether environmental protection
and economic development were consistent or antithetical to each other. See 11 I.L.M. 1416
(1972).
3. See The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [here-
inafter Rio Declaration]; Agenda 21, supra note 1. Although not legally binding, they pro-
vide evidence of customary international law. Prins. 1 and 4, respectively, of the Rio Decla-
ration, recognize that human beings are at the center of development concerns, and that
environmental protection is an integral part of development.
Other UNCED documents include The Non-Legally Binding Statement on Principles for
a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of
All Types of Forests, 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992); and two legally binding treaties, United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into effect
on Mar. 21, 1994), and United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 818 (entered into effect Dec. 29, 1993).
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ally do not participate in negotiations or decision-making. Fre-
quently, they do not even know about development plans for their
lands until after agreement has been reached between distant
government officials and foreign corporations, and the company
enters their community. From the perspective of indigenous peo-
ples, then, industrial natural resources development is typically
characterized by the arrival-uninvited--of outsiders who wield
overwhelming technological, economic and political power. For
the most part, these powerful outsiders define the rules of en-
gagement and dramatically transform natural and social envi-
ronments.
At the time of the Earth Summit, the tragic legacy of the interna-
tional oil industry in Ecuador's Amazon region was well-
known-a legacy that includes broken communities, pollution,
colonization, deforestation, impoverished natural resources, and
outstanding claims and grievances. Halting the destruction of the
Amazon Rainforest had reached the top of the international envi-
ronmental agenda, and recognition of the threat posed by oil de-
velopment to indigenous peoples and tropical forests around the
world was growing.4 At the same time, governments of develop-
ing nations with oil and mineral resources were eager for reve-
nues from those resources, and needed foreign investment and
corporations to locate and exploit them. In response, a number of
transnational corporations (TNCs) acknowledged the need to re-
form their operations. As with governments at the Earth Summit,
these companies vowed to change course in order to reconcile in-
dustrial natural resource development with sustainable develop-
ment.
This article begins with an overview of participation by TNCs
and indigenous peoples in UNCED. It continues with a case
study that examines the experience of indigenous Quichua with
one of the first voluntary initiatives by a TNC to achieve sustain-
able development in Amazonia, by Occidental Petroleum in Ec-
4. See, e.g., UNrrED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENTS
AND OPERATIONS ON THE LANDS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS PURSUANT TO SUB-COMMISSION RESOLUTION
1990/26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/49 (1991); COMMISSION ON DEVELOPMENT AND
ENVIRONMENT FOR AMAZONIA, AMAZONIA WITHOUT MYTHS (n.d.) (prepared with the Inter-
American Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme and Amazon Co-
operation Treaty for UNCED).
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uador. It continues with some general observations about current
activities by other oil companies in the region. The article con-
cludes that, a decade after the Earth Summit, a considerable gap
remains between the promise of sustainable development and the
reality of development by TNCs in indigenous territories in Ama-
zonia; that transparency, environmental regulation and account-
ability of TNCs will be required to achieve sustainable develop-
ment; that the principle of prior informed consent should be
applied in order to protect the rights of indigenous peoples in the
development process; and that unsustainable patterns of oil con-
sumption need to be addressed.
II. BUSINESS, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, AND THE EARTH SUMMiT
The Earth Summit was the first major UN-sponsored global con-
ference with strong business participation, led by the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the newly formed Business
Council for Sustainable Development.5 Representatives of indus-
try promoted the idea that international corporations can, and
will, play a key role in implementing. sustainable development.
However, they vigorously-and successfully--opposed even a
minimal system of international environmental regulation. They
also opposed the elaboration of a clearly defined set of standards
for acceptable international corporate behavior. Instead, they
proposed and promoted international self regulation by individ-
ual firms and industry trade associations. While acknowledging
that industry as a whole (not international firms) might need some
prodding to improve environmental performance, they claimed
that transnational corporations are more likely than domestic
firms to be "green" in developing countries. A number of TNCs
proclaimed their commitment to sustainable development and
good environmental citizenship, and asserted that the real envi-
ronmental "troublemakers" are national industries in developing
countries.6 Many environmentalists were skeptical of expressions
of corporate goodwill and disappointed at the failure of govern-
5. See generally ICC, "Business Charter for Sustainable Development" (1991); WORLD
BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (WBCSD), CHANGING COURSE: A
GLOBAL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).
6. See generally Harris Gleckman, Transnational Corporations and Sustainable Devel-
opment: Reflections from Inside the Debate (Aug. 21, 1992) (draft manuscript, on file with
the author); ICC, supra note 5; WBSCD, supra note 5.
[Vol. 27:2
Sustainable Development in Amazonia
ments to define global rules to regulate corporate conduct to
achieve sustainable development. The understated reality, how-
ever, seemed to be that governments were counting on private
corporations to pay for and carry out sustainable development. 7
In lieu of international regulation, developing countries commit-
ted themselves to enact effective regulation at the national level to
protect the environment and implement international commit-
ments. Significantly, they emphasized the importance of broad
public participation in environmental decision-making and im-
plementation, including participation by residents of affected
communities. 8 A number of major social groups (Major Groups)
were identified, whose "commitment and genuine involvement"
would be "critical to the effective implementation" of sustainable
development, and a section of Agenda 21 was dedicated to"strengthening the role" of those groups.9 Both "business and in-
dustry" and "indigenous people and their communities" were in-
cluded as Major Groups.' 0 In a chapter on business and industry,
a new but growing trend was recognized and encouraged: volun-
tary initiatives by "enlightened leaders" in business and industry,
including transnational corporations, whereby "self-regulations
and greater responsibilities" are taken to ensure that their activi-
ties have "minimal impacts on human health and the environ-
ment" and "foster openness and dialogue" with the public." In a
7. Indeed, the 1990s saw a dramatic change in the patterns of international capital flows
to developing countries. Development aid from industrial countries dropped, and private
capital flows in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) increased. As a proportion of
capital flowing into developing countries, FDI rose from 33% in 1991 to 75% in 1996.
WORLD BusINEss COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SIGNALS OF CHANGE: BUSINESS
PROGRESS TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 44 (1997). See also WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (1997).
8. See, e.g., Agenda 21, supra note 1 23.2 ("One of the fundamental prerequisites for the
achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision-
making.... Individuals, groups and organizations should have access to information rele-
vant to environment and development held by national authorities...."); Rio Declaration,
supra note 3 at prin. 10 (recognizing the rights of all concerned citizens to participate in en-
vironmental decision-making and implementation, to access to environmental information,
and to effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and
remedy).
9. Agenda 21, supra note 1 23.1.
10. See generally id. at chs. 23-32. The other Major Groups are women, children and
youth, nongovernmental organizations, local authorities, workers and their trade unions,
the scientific and technological community, and farmers.
11. Id. ' 30.3. See also id. J 30.8 ("voluntary private initiatives" should be encouraged);
30.10(b) ("Business and industry, including transnational corporations, should be encour-
2002]
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related but less prominent provision, the Rio Declaration en-
dorsed free trade and economic globalization as a means to
achieve sustainable development and "better address the prob-
lems of environmental degradation."12
Participation by indigenous peoples in UNCED was limited;
however, they organized their own, parallel conference nearby,
the World Conference at Kari-Oca. Some 400 indigenous repre-
sentatives attended. Although most were from Brazil, partici-
pants included representatives from Asia, Africa, the Pacific,
Europe and other parts of the Americas. Kari-Oca provided in-
digenous peoples with a forum to discuss sustainable develop-
ment issues, resulting in the elaboration of the Kari-Oca Declara-
tion, for presentation to UNCED. 13 The Kari-Oca Conference also
made indigenous peoples and their demands highly visible to dip-
lomats and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at the official
summit, and to the press and public.
After much lobbying, the coordinator of the Kari-Oca Confer-
ence, Marcos Terena, was allowed to address the official UNCED
conference. His central message was that a key reason for envi-
ronmental degradation and poverty is that governments do not
allow indigenous peoples, the real guardians of nature, to partici-
aged to adopt and report on the implementation of codes of conduct promoting, the best
environmental practice, such as the Business Charter on Sustainable Development of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the chemical industry's responsible care
initiative"); 30.22 ("Business and industry, including transnational corporations, should be
encouraged to establish world-wide corporate policies on sustainable development....");
30.26 ("Business and industry, including transnational corporations, should ensure respon-
sible and ethical management of products and processes from the point of view of health,
safety and environmental aspects. Towards this end, business and industry should in-
crease self-regulation, guided by appropriate codes, charters and initiatives integrated into
all elements of business planning and decision-making, and fostering openness and dia-
logue with employees and the public.")
12. Rio Declaration, supra note 3 at prin. 12, provides:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic
system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all
countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade pol-
icy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.
13. INT'L ALLIANCE OF INDIGENOUS-TRIBAL PEOPLES OF THE TROPICAL FOREST & EURO-
PEAN ALLIANCE wrrH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS (1997). Three indigenous organizations sponsored the
Kari-Oca Conference: Inter-Tribal Committee of Brazil, Coordinating Body of Indigenous
Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA), and Centro Mocovi (from Argentina).
[Vol. 27:2
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pate in decision-making; instead, they impose unsustainable
models of development and conservation on indigenous peoples,
and do not recognize their fundamental rights. He also asserted
the inalienable right of indigenous peoples to self-determination
and ancestral territories. 14
Although the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 include language
that recognizes the contribution of indigenous peoples to envi-
ronmentally sound and sustainable development, and underscore
the importance of their participation in future development activi-
ties,'5 representatives of indigenous peoples were disappointed
with UNCED. Many felt like bystanders in a global negotiation
over the future of their resources. Overall, the Rio Declaration
and Agenda 21 were disheartening, because governments refused
to recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination
and ancestral territories. Instead, they emphasized state sover-
eignty over resources, and affirmed the sovereign right of states
"to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environ-
mental and development policies." 16 From the perspective of in-
digenous peoples, the imposition of development activities in
their lands, without consent, violates their fundamental rights.
Regardless of whether imposed development is carried out by
governments, TNCs, or small-sized entrepreneurs, for indigenous
peoples it represents colonization of their territory by outsiders
and theft of their resources.
The UNCED documents also failed to recognize the collective
dimension of indigenous identity and rights, by using the term
"indigenous people and their communities" instead of "indige-
nous peoples." For indigenous peoples, the refusal by govern-
ments to put the "s" on "indigenous people" denies their collec-
14. Id.
15. For example, in addition to recognizing indigenous communities as a Major Group,
Agenda 21 refers to them in chapters addressing several program areas. The Rio Declara-
tion, at prin. 22, states:
Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a vital
role in environmental management and development because of their knowledge
and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support their identity,
culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the achievement of
sustainable development.
Rio Declaration, supra note 3.
Moreover, participatory rights for indigenous people are included in provisions that af-
firm broad participatory rights for all individuals. See supra note 8.
16. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 3 at prin. 2.
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tive identity as peoples. That, in turn, undermines their ability to
collectively defend and realize their rights, ignores a basic defin-
ing feature of their existence, and fails to respect their distinct
identity.17 Notwithstanding these shortcomings, both the recogni-
tion of indigenous peoples as a Major Group, and the emphasis on
broad participation in decision-making and implementation, are
regarded as significant achievements for indigenous peoples.
Since the Earth Summit, the term "sustainable development"
has become popular; however, its meaning remains poorly de-
fined. In essence, sustainable development recognizes the concept
of inter-generational equity, and the need to integrate environ-
mental and development concerns and decision-making, in order
to ensure that development not only meets the needs of present
generations, but also is fair to future generations. 18 In a related
trend, the call for TNCs to serve as stewards of sustainable devel-
opment and environmental and social responsibility in the devel-
oping world has also blossomed since UNCED, encouraged by a
growing number of TNCs. In 1991, the ICC launched the Business
Charter for Sustainable Development, a statement of sixteen envi-
ronmental principles. By 1997, it had been translated into twenty-
three languages and supported by more than 2,500 companies
worldwide. 19 The 1990s also saw a proliferation of other volun-
17. For a fuller discussion, see International Alliance, supra note 13.
One potentially significant provision of Agenda 21, that is relevant to the problem of
imposed development, appears in the chapter on indigenous communities as a Major
Group. It states that governments "should aim at... recognition that the lands of indige-
nous people and their communities should be protected from activities that are environ-
mentally unsound or that the indigenous people concerned consider to be socially and cul-
turally inappropriate." Agenda 21, supra note 1 at I 26.3(a)(ii).
18. The concept of sustainable development was developed in the Brundtland report,
defined as "development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs." WORLD COMM'N ON ENVIRONMENT
AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987).
19. WBCSD, supra note 7 at 7. By 1997, the World Business Council for Sustainable De-
velopment (WBCSD, formerly the Business Council for Sustainable Development) included
120 international companies from 35 countries and more than 20 industrial sectors "united
by a shared commitment to the environment and to the principles of economic growth and
sustainable development." Id. at 4. In a report prepared for the United Nations General
Assembly Special Session, "Earth Summit + 5," to review progress five years after UNCED,
WBCSD claims that business has "changed a great deal since the decades preceding 1992
Earth Summit" and made "substantial progress" towards implementing sustainable devel-
opment. At the same time, it acknowledges that "society is still a long way from achieving
sustainable development, and that further progress will require contributions from all sec-
tors of society." Id. at 6. The report argues that trade promotes sustainable development
[Vol. 27:2
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tary codes of conduct and industry initiatives purporting to pro-
tect the environment, human rights, and labor. At the same time,
however, concern about the environmental and human conse-
quences of operations by TNCs in developing countries has
grown. Indeed, that controversy has become a central element of
the current debate about free trade and globalization.
One business sector where these trends have unfolded with
considerable prominence is the international oil industry. One re-
gion where they have had-and continue to have-serious conse-
quences for indigenous peoples and the environment is Amazo-
nia. Since 1990, a growing number of international oil companies
have pledged to reform operations, to protect the environment
and promote sustainable development. While understandably re-
luctant to belittle national environmental standards and capacity
on the record, these companies have publicly pledged to go be-
yond what is legally required by host countries. Although most
corporate commitments are vague and inexplicit, in essence, they
promise to voluntarily raise standards for environmental protec-
tion and community relations and implement new models of re-
sponsible operations.
A popular view has emerged: that "corporate responsibility"
and "best practice" by TNCs-generally referred to in Spanish as"normas internacionales" (international standards) and "tecnologia
de punta" (cutting edge technology)-will complement nascent
government regulation, as developing nations gain environmental
experience and capacity, and strengthen national democratic insti-
tutions and the rule of law, including environmental law. How-
ever, those assumptions are seldom checked by close observation
of corporate conduct in the developing world.
A related idea is that responsible TNCs can create new models
to demonstrate that economic development and environmental
protection can co-exist. In one high profile initiative in Peru, offi-
cials of Royal Dutch Shell were unusually candid in describing
their operations. When asked what the government requires of
Shell in the environmental arena, the chief environmental man-
ager said: "We tell them what they want.... The government re-
and higher environmental standards, but also recognizes that "there will always be a need
for clear, effective, enforced regulations, especially in cases of threat to human health" and
for "effective citizen participation in decision-making." Id. at 6-7, 44-45, 48, 50-55.
2002]
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quires that we keep our promises." 20 Another official was more
visionary. He said that Peru's environmental guidelines are"young," but expressed hope that government officials are "on a
learning curve." At the time, oversight was not significant; envi-
ronmental officials primarily asked the company for documenta-
tion. However, Shell expected Peru's "environmental division-
always the weakest group in any institution" -to change and be-
come more active and competent over time. The company, he
said, looked forward to working with the government to demon-
strate a model operation that environmental officials could use to
raise standards for operations by other companies throughout the
Amazon region.21
III. CASE STUDY: OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR22
One of the first voluntary initiatives by a TNC to implement"sustainable development" in indigenous communities in Ama-
zonia was developed in Ecuador by the U.S.-based company, Oc-
cidental Petroleum. According to corporate officials and some re-
ports in the press, the initiative is a success. For example, The
Houston Chronicle reported that it "seems a model of how oil can
20. Interview with Bruce Skinner, Health, Safety & Environment Manager, The Camisea
Project, Bechtel-Cosapi-Odebrecht Consortium, in Lima, Peru (July 7,1998).
21. Interview with Murray Jones, Chief of Health, Safety and Environment, Shell Pros-
pecting and Development (Peru) B.V., in Lima, Peru (July 9 and 15, 1998). As a general mat-
ter, the initiative by Shell-which included exploratory drilling and plans to produce natu-
ral gas and condensate in the Camisea gas fields-is noteworthy because of unprecedented
efforts by corporate officials to reach out to a wide range of stakeholders and facilitate the
distribution of information about environmental and social standards and practices. How-
ever, Shell cancelled the project a few months before construction was expected to begin,
after failing to reach agreement with Peru over the distribution, pricing and export of the
gas. Occidental objects to any comparison with Shell's Camisea project, arguing-
correctly-that it is easier to nurture good stakeholder relations about future plans, and
considerably more difficult to maintain them after the operations are up and running. In
Nigeria, Shell has been notably less forthcoming with information about existing opera-
tions.
22. A comprehensive review of environmental and community relations standards and
practices is beyond the scope of this article. For a fuller discussion, see Judith Kimerling,
International Environmental Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields: the Privatization of Envi-
ronmental Law, 26 COLUM. J.ENvTL. L. 289 (2001) [hereinafter Kimerling 2001a], and Judith
Kimerling, Uncommon Ground: Occidental's Land Access and Community Relations Standards
and Practices in Quichua Communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 11 LAw & ANTHROPOLOGY
179 (2001) [hereinafter Kimerling 2001b]. The Occidental case study is based on those arti-
cles. Research for the study was supported by a grant from the Research Foundation of the
City University of New York.
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be extracted in environmentally sensitive areas of the tropics." 23
Oil and Gas Journal reported that Occidental "has implemented a
comprehensive strategy of strict environmental protection meas-
ures and aggressive community relations initiatives," and charac-
terized the undertaking an "unqualified success" and a "world
class" environmental operation.24 On a local level, Occidental has
assured residents-who are aware of environmental devastation
caused by the continued use of antiquated technology by other
companies in the region-that its operations are environmentally
benign because they use international standards and cutting edge
technology.
Occidental has also produced a glossy Spanish-language bro-
chure entitled Oxy, Certificada ISO 14001 (Oxy [Occidental], ISO
14001 Certified) and an English-language video called The Human
Face of Petroleum. The brochure has been distributed in Ecuador;
the video has been distributed in response to inquiries in the U.S.
about the operations. These materials paint a portrait of corporate
responsibility. They say all the right things, and avow a commit-
ment to protect the environment, respect indigenous cultures, be a
good neighbor, and promote self-reliant sustainable development.
Color photographs show proud and smiling indigenous residents,
and greenery around oil field installations. Even roofs, tanks and
pipelines are green.
Company practices, however, do not consistently match that
portrait. In a recent study, visits to indigenous Quichua commu-
nities featured in the materials showed that there are a number of
problems and concerns, from the perspective of local residents.
An effort to obtain meaningful information about environmental
standards and practices indicates that Occidental is not willing to
disclose the precise standards that apply to the operations; this
and the refusal to disclose other important environmental infor-
mation make it impossible to independently verify corporate
claims of environmental excellence.
23. Dudley Althaus, Amazon's Empty Legacy; Big Oil Responds to Environment; Toll on Rain
Forest, Culture Still Unacceptable to Critics, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 15, 1996, at Al.
24. Bob Williams, Oxy's Strategy on Environment, Community Issues Key to Success of Pro-
ject in Ecuador's Rain Forest, OIL AND GAS J., Apr. 21, 1997, at 44-45 [hereinafter Williams,
1997]. Oil and Gas Journal describes itself as "the Bible of the oil and gas industry for almost
a century." Bob Williams, Petroleum's Brave New World, OIL AND GAS J., Dec. 13, 1999, at 3.
2002]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Background
The Amazon Rainforest is the world's largest remaining humid
tropical forest. It contains the greatest biological diversity of any
known ecosystem, is a natural carbon reservoir, and is believed to
contain 20-25% of the world's flowing fresh water. It is generally
regarded as an environmentally sensitive region, and is home to
hundreds of ethnolinguistic groups of indigenous peoples, many
of whom still live in sustainable societies, and whose health, well-
being and cultural survival are closely linked with environmental
quality. Oil and gas exploration and production is an industrial
activity. Among other environmental impacts, it typically gener-
ates large quantities of wastes with toxic constituents, presents
risks of spills, and destroys and degrades ecosystems that people
depend on for their sustenance and well-being.
"Saving the Rainforest" became a popular cause with environ-
mentalists and the public in the late 1980s. Around 1990, docu-
mentation of irresponsible oil field practices in Ecuador's Amazon
Region by the U.S.-based TNC, Texaco, and other companies,
added a new issue to the rainforest agenda. The revelations
spawned a surge in national and international concern about the
impact of oil development on the environment and human rights
in tropical forests, and buttressed local grievances. 25
25. The Ecuador study was the first to document widespread pollution and other envi-
ronmental and social impacts from oil development in tropical forests. It was written by
the author, based on extensive field observations and interviews during repeated visits to
the region in 1989-90, in collaboration with the indigenous organizations FCUNAE (Federa-
tion of Comunas Union of Natives of the Ecuadorian Amazon) and CONFENIAE (Confed-
eration of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon), and other research. The
disclosures first appeared in a draft report in 1989, which was translated into Spanish and
German. Subsequently, the author expanded the report; in 1991, it was published as Ama-
zon Crude by a major U.S. environmental NGO, Natural Resources Defense Council. A
Spanish-language adaptation of the book was published in Ecuador in 1993. See generally
Judith Kimerling, AMAZON CRUDE (1991) [hereinafter Kimerling 1991]; Judith Kimerling,
CRUDO AMAZONICO (1993). Portions of Amazon Crude are reprinted in Judith Kimerling,
Disregarding Environmental Law: Petroleum Development in Protected Natural Areas and Indige-
nous Homelands in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 849 (1991). At
the time of the disclosures, officials in Ecuador's government professed ignorance about
the environmental impacts of oil development. They claimed that Texaco-the first com-
pany to find and develop commercial fields of Amazon crude-was their "professor", and
taught them how to produce oil, but not how to protect the environment. See, e.g., Kimer-
ling 1991 at xxvi. Skilled Ecuadorian oil workers were so unaware of the hazards of crude
oil during the 1970s and '80s that they applied it to their heads to prevent balding; they sat
in the sun or covered their hair with plastic caps overnight. To remove the crude, they
washed their hair with diesel. Judith Kimerling, Rights, Responsibilities and Realities: Envi-
[Vol. 27:2
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In response, a number of TNCs acknowledged that national
governments have not implemented meaningful environmental
regulation, and that local communities bear the costs of irrespon-
sible development without sharing in the benefits. They publicly
pledged to change their practices, and implement environmental
protection and community relations measures that go beyond
what is required by governments in host countries. While recog-
nizing that there have been problems in the past, a growing num-
ber of TNCs-including Occidental in Ecuador-now claim to
voluntarily abide by "international standards" or "best practice." 26
Although corporate officials generally cite ethical rather than legal
obligations and responsibilities, national laws in a number of
countries, including Ecuador, include general provisions that, in
theory, require oil companies to abide by unspecified "interna-
tional standards." 27
The emerging recognition that a double standard of environ-
mental protection is no longer appropriate could be a significant
policy development in Amazonia. 28 Nonetheless, the claim-or
ronmental Protection Law in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields, 2 Sw J. L. & TRADE AM. 293 (1995).
In the wake of the disclosures, environmental protection became an important policy issue
in Ecuador. When challenged, both government officials and oil companies must now at
least appear to be "green."
26. At the time, Occidental did not make similar promises for existing operations in
Peru or Colombia. Other companies in Ecuador included Conoco, Maxus (now Repsol-
YPF), and ARCO. Both Conoco and ARCO have since sold their interests in Ecuador. In
the Peruvian Amazon, operators that promised to voluntarily implement some variation of
international standards or best practice during the 1990s included Royal Dutch Shell, Mobil
Corp. and Chevron (now ChevronTexaco).
27. Companies arguably also have a legal duty to use a reasonable level of care in their
operations, irrespective of government regulation. In Ecuador, for example, the Civil Code
establishes a general duty of care, similar to a common law duty in the U.S. It is defined as
the duty to use the same level of care as "a good father of a family." It applies generally to
conduct by companies, and there is no principled reason why it should not apply to envi-
ronmental practices by oil companies, when others could be harmed thereby. Civil Code,
arts. 29, 2214,2215, R.O. No. 399 (1982) (Ecuador). For a fuller discussion of Ecuador's Civil
Code, see Kimerling 1995, supra note 25. In addition, for corporate decisions made in the
U.S., common law duties arguably apply even when actions to implement the decisions
and actionable impacts occur abroad.
28. Consensus on this point does not necessarily extend to other regions or industrial
sectors. As a general matter, TNCs have expressed growing support for the concept of go-
ing beyond legal requirements, to apply equivalent standards for corporate environmental
management on a global basis. See, e.g., ICC, "Business Charter for Sustainable Develop-
ment" (1991), Principles for Environmental Management, supra note 5 at prin. 3 ("To con-
tinue to improve corporate policies, programs and environmental performance... with le-
gal requirements as a starting point; and to apply the same environmental criteria
internationally.") At the same time, industry has vigorously opposed international rule-
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requirement-to abide by "International Standards," "Best Prac-
tice" or some other variation of "world class" "responsible" stan-
dards and practices risks becoming a hollow platitude in many ar-
eas-and undermining rather than promoting national
environmental law- because affected communities, environ-
mental and human rights advocates, and even government offi-
cials and policymakers do not really know what it means. To
date, neither governments, industry nor the academic community
have clearly defined what "international standards" and "best
practice" are, and how to measure compliance. Like "sustainable
development," the terms have become fashionable in corporate,
governmental and some NGO circles; however, most of the public
discourse has been very general, focusing on principles rather
than the specifics of how to achieve them or measure compli-
ance.29 Especially in the corporate world, the terms are not used to
refer to binding requirements, but refer instead to non-binding
goals.
Occidental launched its initiative to improve environmental
protection and community relations in Ecuador around 1990, in a
200,000-hectare 30 area known as "Block 15." At the time, Occiden-
tal had conducted some oil exploration, but had not yet begun
production. In July 1992, soon after UNCED, Occidental declared
making and regulation. These apparently mixed signals can be reconciled by the view that
TNCs favor voluntary international corporate standards, but oppose legally binding ones.
For the most part, governments have defended their sovereign right to determine their own
environmental and development laws and polices, and agreed to a contradictory principle
at the Earth Summit:
States shall enact effective environmental legislation. Environmental standards,
management objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and devel-
opmental context to which they apply. Standards applied by some countries may be
inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other countries, in
particular developing countries.
Rio Declaration, supra note 3 at prin. 11. Developing nations advocate the principle of dif-
ferentiated environmental standards based on the belief that costly environmental re-
quirements could undermine economic development, and they may choose to prioritize the
generation of jobs and revenues over environmental concerns. Industrial nations, they say,
became wealthy at great environmental expense, and should not expect poor countries to
forego those trade-offs.
29. In U.S. domestic environmental law, the use of technology-based standards for pol-
lution control is well developed for some sources; the specifics of this experience, however,
are generally not brought to bear on the trade debate or public discussions of "best prac-
tice" for international oil field operations.
30. One hectare equals 100 meters x 100 meters or 2.47 acres; 200,000 hectares is 2,000
square kilometers.
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the commercial marketability of early discoveries. Three weeks
later, Ecuador authorized the company to begin production activi-
ties; 31 extraction began in mid-1993.32 Occidental estimates Block
15's total reserves at 300-400 million barrels, 33 an amount equiva-
lent to roughly fifteen to twenty-one days of petroleum product
consumption in the U.S.
Block 15 crosses two major rivers, the Napo and Aguarico. It
includes lands that are titled to indigenous Quichua in the Napo
basin, and indigenous Secoya and Siona in the Aguarico basin. It
also includes lands that are protected natural areas under Ecua-
dorian law-Limoncocha Biological Reserve and Pafacocha Pro-
tected Forest, as well as parts of Yasuni National Park and Cuya-
beno Wildlife Reserve, are located in Block 15. Residents of Block
15 also include a small number of colonists, or settlers, from Ec-
uador's highland and coastal regions, and Shuar. The Shuar are
indigenous to Ecuador's southern Amazon region and, like most
colonists, migrated to the area in search of land in the wake of the
oil boom that followed the discovery of commercial quantities of
Amazon crude in 1967 by Texaco.
Occidental initiated its search for oil in the western part of Block
15; currently, production facilities are located in the west, in the
Napo basin. According to corporate officials in Ecuador, Occiden-
tal produces some 18,000 barrels of oil per day in Block 15, from
22 production wells on six drilling platforms. A seventh platform
is the site of a waste injection well.34 The platforms and a Central
31. Modified Service Contract for the Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons
(Crude Oil) in Block 15 in the Ecuadorian Amazon Region, Celebrated between the Ecua-
dorian State, through The State Oil Company of Ecuador (Petroecuador) and the Company
Occidental Exploration and Production Company, Sucursal Ecuador, Quito (May 21, 1999)
[hereinafter Contract], 11 2.1-2.4. The Contract, 1992 Environmental Impact Study and
Management Plan, Ecuadorian legal provisions, agreements with and statements by local
residents, and some other materials were reviewed in Spanish, but are cited in English for
the reader's convenience. Translations are by the author.
32. In addition to Ecuador, Occidental has operated in Peru and Colombia. Operations
in Ecuador are the newest major project; as a result, they incorporate Occidental's highest
environmental standards. In the words of Occidental's Worldwide Environmental Man-
ager, Clark Hull, "for Oxy, Ecuador is the top." Interview with Clark Hull, Worldwide En-
vironmental Manager, Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation, Palo Alto, Cal. (Nov. 10, 1999)
[hereinafter Hull Interview]. Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation is a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corporation. Occidental Exploration and Production
Company, Sucursal Ecuador (OEPC or Occidental Ecuador) is a wholly-owned Ecuadorian
subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corporation.
33. Williams 1997, supra note 24.
34. Another injection well shares a platform with two producing wells, and a third injec-
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Processing Facility (CPF) are connected by a network of unpaved
roads. Alongside the roads, buried pipelines (flow lines) carry a
mixture of oil, natural gas and formation water-extracted from
the wells-to CPF. Two lines pass under the Napo River;35 how-
ever, there are no bridges, and barges are used to carry personnel
and vehicles across the river.
At CPF, crude oil is separated from the gas and formation wa-
ter. Oil field formation water typically contains toxic levels of
salts, in addition to hydrocarbons, heavy metals, and other chemi-
cals. It can also contain naturally-occurring radioactive material
(NORM). In Block 15, the ratio of water to oil is high and, accord-
ing to Occidental, roughly 65,000 barrels (2.73 million gallons) of
formation water wastes, known as produced water, are generated
every day. The separation process also generates some 4.5 million
cubic feet of gas every day. According to Occidental, 30% of the
gas is used to power the operations; the rest is burned as waste at
CPF.36 The 40-hectare site also includes storage and pumping fa-
cilities, living quarters for workers, offices, a sewage treatment
system, and equipment maintenance facilities.37 Additional flow
lines carry produced water from separation facilities to injection
wells.
CPF and the production and injection wells are located in four
Quichua communities: Rio Jivino, Limoncocha, Itaya and
Pompeya. In addition, Occidental operates a landfill in the Shuar
community of Yamanunka. Since production began, Occidental
has steadily expanded exploration and production activities
deeper into the Amazon. In 1996, an exploratory well in the
southeastern corner of Block 15, in the remote Quichua commu-
tion well is located at CPF. The information was provided during a formal visit to CPF for
the case study, in a presentation by and interview with Marcos Ramirez, Acting Chief of
Field Operations, OEPC, and Jose Verdesoto, Acting Field Chief of Health, Safety and Envi-
ronment, OEPC, on Aug. 9, 1999 [hereinafter CPF Visit].
A higher production level-"around 30,000 barrels/day"-was subsequently reported
by the press in Ecuador. Oxy Signifies 2.8% of GNP in the Petroleum Sector, HOY, June 29,
2000. The higher number may reflect Occidental's assumption of operations in "unified oil
fields" that were previously managed by Petroecuador in the Limoncocha area. Those fa-
cilities are not included in the study.
35. OCCIDENTAL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION COMPANY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STUDY AND MANAGEMENT PLAN, BLOCK 15, VOLUME I, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STUDY 3
(Jan. 1992) (prepared by Ambientec Ltda) [hereinafter 1992 EIA].
36. CPF Visit, supra note 34.
37. 1992 EIA, supra note 35.
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nity of El Eden, located commercially-valuable oil; currently, new
production facilities are under construction to exploit the reserves.
In an interview, corporate officials confirmed that Occidental
seeks to incrementally expand operations throughout all of Block
15, but refused to disclose details of the plans. 38 Under the com-
pany's contract with Ecuador (hereinafter "Contract"), Occidental
has the obligation and exclusive right to operate existing produc-
tion facilities in Block 15 until 2012; and to find, develop and op-
erate subsequent discoveries until 2019.
B. The Two Faces of Occidental
Occidental's portrait of sustainable development has empha-
sized the importance of improving the well-being of residents in
communities where it operates, and highlighted a series of com-
munity development projects supported by the company. This is
consistent with basic principles of sustainable development that
place people at the center of development concerns, but it also re-
flects the inherently unsustainable nature of oil extraction and
consumption. During the 1980s, before launching its voluntary
initiative, Occidental basically applied the same standards and
practices as Texaco, operating as if no people lived in the oil fields.
For example, in Limoncocha, a home and garden were destroyed
to mine sand for construction activities, and part of another gar-
den was leveled for a drill site, over the objection of residents. 39 In
the words of a man from a nearby community, "during that time,
the companies came to work in our communities but did not even
greet us." Now, Occidental "greets" residents when it enters their
community; however, according to Quichua in communities
where production is underway, Occidental's interest in their well-
being has not been sustained. During early contacts, the company
promised residents that they would benefit from oil development
"forever". But after production facilities were up and running,
Occidental's community relations practices changed. Many resi-
38. By law, Occidental must maintain a five-year development plan and update it on an
annual basis, for approval by Ecuador's Ministry of Energy and Mines. See Law of Hydro-
carbons, art. 31(k), R.O. No. 711 (Nov. 15, 1978); and Contract, supra note 31 at 919. 3.3.33,
3.3.36, 3.3.41and 5.1.7. However, the company refuses to disclose the current plan. Inter-
view with Vicki Hollub, Chief of Field Operations and Acting General Manager, OEPC,
and Patricio Rivera, Safety & Environment Manager, OEPC, in Quito, Ecuador (Aug. 18,
1999) [hereinafter Hollub and Rivera Interview].
39. Kimerling 1991, supra note 22.
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dents now feel "thrown away" and say that their quality of life
has been impaired, rather than improved, by oil development in
their communities.40
Currently, Occidental's community relations standards and
practices have two faces. Outside the oil patch, the company con-
tinues to say the right things; but in the oil fields, it acts differ-
ently. In the video, The Human Face of Petroleum, the narrator says:
In summary, Occidental has pursued a single goal in relations with
native communities: to help, but not to dictate. We're convinced
two worlds can meet and live in harmony, within a framework of
mutual respect and tolerance. We are committed to honoring the
world view and culture of our neighbors in the rainforest, even as
we support their efforts to develop new sources of income and im-
prove their lives. Above all, this goal should be pursued without
creating bonds of dependency and paternalism.... How can we
give petroleum development a human face? By working responsi-
bly; by helping the communities among which we live to make ef-
fective use of local resources and building self reliance. In the end,
this will be our greatest contribution to sustainable development.
An apparently updated version of the video claims Occidental is
"doing our work responsibly" and reaffirms the company's com-
mitment to respect indigenous cultures and promote self-reliant
sustainable development in partnership with local residents:
In summary, all the progress made so far, plus the progress still to
be made, pursues the vision of two different worlds living together,
different but fraternal. We are convinced that it is possible, within a
framework of respect for the world view of those cultures living in
the Block 15 area, to take solidary interest in their hardships, to sup-
port their initiatives in working toward development with dignity,
providing each stakeholder with a conducive, supportive environ-
ment without creating the bonds of absolute dependence and there-
fore without paternalism. This is how we are doing our work re-
sponsibly, so that when Occidental finishes its operations, the
communities whom we have been living among will have come a
long way toward truly sustainable development. Then, and only
then, we will be able to say proudly but also humbly that we have
40. Reports of residents' views are based on interviews during visits to Block 15 in 1998,
1999 and 2000. The author has conducted field work with Quichua in the area since 1989; a
number of residents spoke with her in confidence and asked that their names not be pub-
lished, due to concern about possible retribution from Occidental or Ecuador's military.
The author also had opportunities to observe interactions between company officials and
residents from Rio Jivino, Limoncocha and El Eden. The author has not worked with the
Shuar, and did not visit Yamanunka for this study.
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concluded a petroleum operation with a genuine human face.41
Similarly, the Oxy, ISO 14001 Certified brochure says that the
company has implemented "innovative community relations ini-
tiatives" to be a good neighbor to local residents, "based on re-
spect for their culture" and assistance for "self reliant economic
development." 42 As in the video, four key action areas are identi-
fied for assistance: infrastructure, education, heath, and commu-
nity self-management and autonomy.43
C. Legal and Policy Framework for Community Relations
The Ecuador materials are consistent with Occidental's pub-
lished corporate policy. Applicable worldwide, the company's
guidelines for community relations emphasize the need to "create
a positive 'good neighbor' culture," and respect the "legal, cul-
tural and social norms" of local communities. 44 The guidance
manual for heath, environment and safety begins by affirming a
commitment to "the highest standards of ethical conduct and so-
cial responsibility," and continues:
A key element in the area of social responsibility is our commitment
to conduct our business in a manner which protects the environ-
ment, maintains a strong safety program for the workplace, and
promotes sound occupational standards among our employees.45
The manual includes a "Good Neighbor Policy" and ten
"Health, Environment and Safety Principles."46 One principle is to
inform members of the public who "may be affected" about
health, safety and environmental issues, and "regularly partici-
pate in an open dialogue with neighboring communities to share
information and respond to the public's input or concerns about
41. The video was first provided to the author in 1997 by the NGO Rainforest Relief.
The second version was received from Occidental in December 1998, in response to a re-
quest for information for academic research about standards and practices in Block 15. Dif-
ferences between the two are minor.
42. OCCIDENTAL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION COMPANY, OxY, ISO 14001 CERTIFIED
12 (1998) [hereinafter Oxy, ISO 140001 CERTIFIED].
43. Id. at 13.
44. OCCIDENTAL OIL AND GAS CORPORATION, HESMS GUIDELINES FOR COMMUNITY RE-
LATIONS (n.d.).
45. OCCIDENTAL OIL & GAS CORPORATION, HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, HESMS GUIDANCE MANUAL (1997) [hereinafter HESMS GUIDANCE
MANUAL].
46. Id. at i, 6-7.
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safety, health and the environment." 47 Another principle states:
"[w]e support the concept of public accountability.. .and intend to
report on our progress in measurable terms.... ,,48
Under Ecuadorian law, oil companies are required to prepare
environmental impact studies at every stage of development
(Estudios de Impactos Ambientales, EIAs). In theory, EIAs should
also address social impacts and include comprehensive baseline
data about the environmental and socio-cultural conditions that
exist before operations begin. In addition, EJAs should assess the
full range of possible environmental and socio-cultural impacts
that could result from the operations, identify measures to miti-
gate adverse impacts, and include a detailed environmental man-
agement plan that contains programs for community relations.49
Occidental's Contract with Ecuador similarly recognizes the
need for social responsibility and the close relationship between
social and environmental standards and practices. The "environ-
mental protection" section of the Contract contains several brief
references to social impacts and community relations.5 0 It also in-
cludes an explicit requirement that Occidental "subordinate the
community relations that the [company] establishes to the corre-
sponding governmental policies, and the supervision of the Dep-
uty Secretary of Environmental Protection of the Ministry of [En-
ergy and Mines]." 51 Notwithstanding this, as with environmental
protection, Ecuador's government has not implemented meaning-
ful regulation of community relations, and has generally left stan-
dards and practices up to oil companies like Occidental, unless
major problems arise. As a general matter, Occidental's environ-
mental and community relations standards and performance have
not been controlled or closely supervised by the government.
In 1998, Ecuador ratified the International Labor Organization
Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO Con-
vention 169), and adopted a new Constitution that, for the first
47. Id. at prin. 8.
48. Id. at prin. 10.
49. Ministry of Energy and Mines, Environmental Regulations for Hydrocarbon Opera-
tions, arts. 52-54, R.O. No. 766 (August 24, 1995) (Ecuador) [hereinafter MEM Environ-
mental Regulations].
50. See, e.g, Contract, supra note 31, 1 5.1.20.5 (EIAs should address social, cultural and
local economy issues) and 5.1.20.7 (EIAs serve as the basis for periodic social-
environmental audits).
51. Id. 5.1.20.3.
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time in its constitutional history, includes a section on the collec-
tive rights of indigenous peoples.52 The constitutional provisions
recognize and protect a number of cultural, political and land
rights, and echo some of the rights and duties that are found in
ILO Convention 169. For example, the Constitution directs the
state to "recognize and guarantee" the rights of indigenous peo-
ples to be consulted about plans and programs for exploration
and exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources that are lo-
cated in their lands and which could affect them environmentally
or culturally; to participate in the benefits that those projects ob-
tain, inasmuch as is possible; and to receive compensation for
socio-environmental damages that are caused to them.53
In addition to collective rights as indigenous peoples, residents
of Block 15 have environmental rights under the new Constitu-
tion, including the right "to live in a healthy and ecologically bal-
anced environment that guarantees sustainable development" 4
and the right to participate-on an informed basis-in all deci-
52. Political Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, Ch. V, sec. 1 (entered into effect
Aug. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Constitution]. Ecuador has had 19 constitutions since becoming
a republic in 1830. This reflects the fact that, although the Constitution is nominally the
supreme law of the land, in practice constitutional law has been unstable and relatively
easy to manipulate, disregard and supplant.
53. Id. Ch. V, sec 1, art. 84 (5). This is similar to Article 15(2) of ILO Convention 169. In-
ternational Labour Organization, C169, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, 1989,28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991).
Other provisions in art. 84 of the Constitution guarantee the rights of indigenous peo-
ples to "maintain, develop and fortify their identity and traditions, in the spiritual, cultural,
linguistic, social, political and economic [spheres]" (9 1); to participate in the "use, admini-
stration and conservation of renewable natural resources that are located in their lands" (9
4); "to formulate priorities in plans and projects for the development and improvement of
their economic and social conditions" (9 13); to occupy ancestral lands and obtain legal title
to them, without charge (91 3); to retain communal lands as inalienable, indivisible and not
subject to prescription or seizure, except under the authority of the State to expropriate
lands for "public utility" (91 2); "to not be displaced, as peoples, from their lands" (91 8); "to
maintain, develop and administer their cultural and historical patrimony" (91 10); "to con-
serve and promote their practices to manage biodiversity and its natural environment" (9
6); "to collective intellectual property rights for their ancestral knowledge; and to its valua-
tion, use and development under the law" (91 9); to have access to a quality bilingual educa-
tion (91 11); to conserve and develop traditional social organizations, ways of living together
and generating and exercising authority (91 7); to use and protect "traditional medical sys-
tems, knowledge and practices, including the right to protect ritual and sacred sites, [and]
plants, animals, minerals and ecosystems that are of vital interest from that point of view"
(' 12); "to use symbols and emblems that identify them" (91 15); and "to participate,
through representatives, in the official bodies that determine the law" (91 14). Id.
54. Id. Ch. V, § 2, art. 86.
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sion-making by the State that could affect the environment.55 Al-
though Ecuador's constitutions have recognized and guaranteed
the right of individuals to live in an environment "free from con-
tamination" since 1984,56 the expanded section on collective envi-
ronmental rights in the new Constitution-and the inclusion of
rights to information and participation in environmental decision-
making-also echo emerging principles of international law, par-
ticularly the UNCED agreements. Despite this, Ecuador has not
adopted meaningful legislation or regulations to implement in-
digenous and environmental rights, or otherwise acted to effectu-
ate them.5 7
Although the implementation of those rights, including rights to
information and participation in development activities and envi-
ronmental decision-making, is primarily the responsibility of the
State, Ecuador has effectively ceded both environmental protec-
tion and community relations in Block 15 to Occidental. Within
Occidental, relations with local communities are handled through
a special unit, primarily staffed by social scientists who are known
as community relations officers.
The most explicit and detailed official statement of Occidental's
community relations standards is found in the environmental
management plan that was prepared by the company and ap-
proved by Ecuador's government in 1992 (hereinafter EMP), as
part of the EIA required prior to starting production operations.
The EMP pre-dates the new Constitution and the conclusion-but
not the preparatory meetings--of the UNCED process. Not sur-
prisingly, it does not provide for consultation with local residents
or contemplate their participation in activities to protect the envi-
ronment.5 8 Instead, it vaguely provides for "assistance" to local
55. Id. Ch. V, § 2, Art. 88 provides: "Every state decision that could affect the environ-
ment must consider with the criteria of the community, prior [to making the decision], for
which they [the community) will be properly informed. The law shall guarantee their par-
ticipation."
56. Id. Title III, ch. H, art. 23, 6 (current provision); in the former Constitution, the pro-
vision is found in Title II, § I, art. 19, 2.
57. One measure has been implemented to varying degrees since the late 1980s. Ecua-
dor has granted legal land titles to a number of indigenous groups in Amazonia, although
few titles have been granted in recent years and, as discussed infra, some lands have been
expropriated for oil production facilities. In addition, Ecuador claims ownership of all sub-
surface hydrocarbons and minerals. Indigenous land titles typically provide that landown-
ers may not "impede or obstruct" oil or mining development.
58. OCCIDENTAL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION COMPANY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
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communities, in a brief section entitled "Community Assistance
Plan." Despite these legal deficiencies, the EMP is described by
Occidental as "the document which collates all regulatory, mitiga-
tion and standards practices to be employed by the project." 59 The
company's recently-revised Contract with Ecuador-which was
signed in 1999 and provides the basic legal blueprint for opera-
tions in Block 15-adopts the 1992 EMP as a legal standard for en-
vironmental protection, without modification. 60
The Community Assistance Plan begins by stating that "[o]ne of
the priorities of Occidental's environmental policies.. .is to seek a
direct benefit" for local communities, in order to improve the
quality of life of the population. 61 Three permanent 62 "assistance
programs" are identified: Assistance for the Satisfaction of Basic
Necessities; Assistance for Cultural Manifestations; and Assis-
tance for the Development of the Basis of Production.63 The terms
STUDY AND MANAGEMENT PLAN, BLOCK 15, VOLUME II, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
PLAN 69-73 (1992) (prepared by Ambientec Ltda.) [hereinafter EMP].
59. Clark Hull, Worldwide Environmental Manger, Occidental Oil and Gas Corpora-
tion, e-mail message to Judith Kimerling (Apr. 17, 2000). Despite this, as discussed infra,
the EMP does not provide a clear and complete statement of environmental standards and
practices.
60. Contract, supra note 31, 1 5.1.20.1, 3.3.35. The Contract with Ecuador, through
Petroecuador (the national oil company), establishes the basic legal terms for Occidental's
operations and its relationship with the Ecuadorian State. Although it requires Occidental
to comply with Ecuadorian law, and provides that Ecuador's laws shall prevail in the event
of a conflict between the law and a provision in the Contract, it is also intended to protect
the company from changing legal requirements and other shortcomings in Ecuador's legal
system. Longstanding deficiencies include: the failure of the rule of law, confusion about
what many applicable laws and regulations require; high turnover and instability of gov-
ernments and high level officials; widespread corruption; political contentiousness, volatil-
ity and personal rivalries; shifting political alliances; minimal systemic legitimacy; and a
general atmosphere of uncertainty about how the law will be interpreted-and adminis-
tered, ignored or reformed-by successive governments. Public confidence in Ecuador's
political class and public institutions, including the judiciary, is minimal.
At the same time, a deepening economic crisis and growing debt burden have made Ec-
uador increasingly desperate for foreign aid (including loans) and investment. In return
for aid and investment, Ecuador is under considerable pressure from the U.S. and other
creditors to establish the rule of law, and promote a stable and predictable legal environ-
ment for foreign investors. As a result, the need to "honor" contracts with TNCs has been
emphasized as a key indicator of both Ecuador's democratic progress-and respect for the
rule of law-and its suitability for foreign investment and loans. For practical purposes,
then, despite its subordination to Ecuador's laws on paper, Occidental's Contract serves as
the basic legal blueprint for operations in Block 15, and for Ecuador, the political and eco-
nomic stakes are high. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling 2001a, supra note 22.
61. EMP, supra note 58, at 69.
62. Id. at 72.
63. Id. at 69.
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of the programs are vague, and no specific commitments are in-
cluded. In addition, there are no measures to evaluate either the
effectiveness of the programs or the impact of Occidental's opera-
tions, generally, on local communities. Instead, the monitoring
program in the EMP establishes a single parameter to monitor all
socio-cultural impacts -"the population composition in the
area" 64 -and the monitoring methodology is to conduct regular
censuses.65 Although a vague statement is included, that "[i]f pos-
sible, other socio-economic indicators will be included in this
monitoring (health, migration, land tenure, for example)," the EIA
does not include the baseline information that would be needed to
do so.66
As a general matter, the baseline socio-cultural information in
the EIA is incomplete and superficial. In addition, some impor-
tant information is contradictory or misleading. For example,
there is no discussion of Quichua culture, except for an erroneous
statement that, unlike other indigenous peoples, the Quichua do
not practice subsistence gardening, hunting and fishing.67 An-
other statement, however, recognizes that they do, but says that
agricultural practices center around the cultivation of manioc and
corn. 68 The Quichua are excellent gardeners and cultivate a wide
range of subsistence crops. Manioc is their most important source
of carbohydrates and is cultivated, in many varieties, by virtually
all Quichua women. Corn, however, is more important to indige-
nous Quechua in the Andes Mountains. Although some corn is
cultivated by lowland Quichua, it is not central to their agricul-
ture, and its importance is dwarfed by other crops, such as manioc
and plantain.69
64. Id. at 24-25.
65. Id. at 25.
66. Id.
67. 1992 EIA, supra note 35, at 265.
68. Id. at 272. Yet another statement recognizes that hunting and fishing are the princi-
pal sources of protein for the Quichua. Id. at 204.
69. This illustrates a general pattern in the EIA, in which information is often presented
in a repetitive, piecemeal and fragmentary manner. Cross-references are not included; in-
formation and analyses are mostly incomplete, frequently superficial, and sometimes in-
ternally inconsistent. This makes the EIA a reader-unfriendly document, limits and seg-
ments impact assessment, and paints a confused and murky portrait of baseline conditions,
operations and standards. Another example of inconsistent information is the reported
population of Limoncocha. One statement puts it at 45 families; another says 25. Id. at 201,
264. According to residents, a recent census counted 150 families, with 830 persons. These
numbers would appear to be significant under Occidental's social impact monitoring
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The only community assistance program that is described in
more than one sentence is Assistance for the Satisfaction of Basic
Necessities. According to the EMP, it is "oriented to help the solu-
tion of the deficits in matters of healthiness, potable water, health
and social assistance." 70 No details are included about the needs
to be addressed or assistance to be provided. As a general matter,
however, residents in Block 15 and throughout Amazonia feel"olvidados," forgotten by their government when it comes to basic
social services and infrastructure, including education, health
care, transportation and communication. Those feelings of ne-
glect, together with the magnitude of "needs" perceived by com-
munities, and the lack of alternative sources of cash income or ru-
ral development, offer TNCs an opportunity to generate
considerable good will among residents at a relatively cheap price.
At the same time, this type of assistance can create dependency,
and lead to endless-potentially insatiable-demands for further
assistance. Oil companies are often seen as the only source of jobs,
income and services, and community needs and residents' de-
mands can soon exceed the level of assistance that companies are
prepared to provide. This can generate disappointment and frus-
tration in communities and sow the seeds of potential conflict
with the company. As a result, when TNCs like Occidental talk
about "providing assistance to local communities without creating
dependency," they are not only responding to widely-held con-
cerns about creating dependency, but also protecting their own in-
terests. In Block 15, there is already evidence of disappointment
and frustration with the level of assistance provided by Occiden-
tal; however, the company's community relations practices appear
to have made those feelings inevitable by creating unrealistically
high expectations during early contacts with residents, in order to
curry favor among them.
The risks of dependency in Block 15 have been exacerbated by
the failure of Occidental's standards to recognize and address the
importance of protecting existing local economies and the natural
resources that allow residents to "help" themselves. As a general
scheme; however, it is unclear from the EMP whether and how the company will respond.
Another example of inconsistent information, discussed infra, relates to land tenure. Over-
all, the EIA includes some useful information, but is incomplete and contains inaccuracies,
inconsistencies, and assertions that are not supported by the record.
70. EMP, supra note 58, at 60-70.
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matter, Quichua in Block 15 do not have much money, but they
are not poor because they have traditionally had access to a
wealth of renewable natural resources that provide secure and
self-reliant sources of food, water, shelter and medicine. Al-
though some cash crops are cultivated in family gardens, most
people rely primarily on a subsistence economy. In addition to
gardening, they hunt, fish and gather in forests, swamps, rivers
and lakes. The destruction, degradation and contamination of
natural resources, then, can create poverty among the people who
use them, lower their standard of living, and strip them of their
security and self-reliance in meeting basic needs.
Despite this, Occidental's EIA and EMP neither clearly identify
the natural resources and habitats that are valuable to local resi-
dents, nor specify concrete measures to protect them. This raises
serious questions about the viability of plans in the EMP to "for-
tify the productive base" 71 of the people and otherwise "improve
[their] quality of life." 72 It also suggests a paternalistic approach
to community relations and local development that relies on rela-
tively cheap handouts in the "beads and trinkets" tradition to
curry favor and diffuse criticism-and a folkloric approach to in-
digenous cultures-rather than a serious effort to know and un-
derstand local residents and their cultures, and develop stan-
dards, practices and development strategies that respect residents'
rights and respond to their concerns and aspirations. According
to residents, Occidental has impoverished hunting in Limoncocha
and Rio Jivino, among other impacts.73
71. EMP, supra note 58, at 70.
72. Id. at 69.
73. Similarly, in El Eden, residents report that fishery resources were impoverished by
exploratory drilling. Occidental's failure to consider the impact of its operations on local
economies and cultures in a meaningful way also raises questions about compliance with
Ecuador's Law of Hydrocarbons. Since 1982, it has required oil companies to present for
approval by the Ministry of Energy and Mines
plans, programs and projects and the respective financing so that exploration and
exploitation activities do not adversely affect the economic and social organization of the
population settled in the areas where the mentioned activities are undertaken and [do
not adversely affect] the local renewable and nonrenewable natural resources.
Law of Hydrocarbons, art. 31(s), R.O. No. 711 (Nov. 15, 1978), as amended by R.O. No. 306
(Aug. 13, 1982) (Ecuador). Subsequent amendments to the law, published in R.O. No. 446
(May 29. 1986), R.O. 283 (Sept. 26, 1989), R.O. No. 121 (Feb. 3, 1993), R.O. No. 326 (Nov. 29,
1993), R.O. No. 346 (Dec. 28, 1993), R.O. No. 523 (Sept. 9, 1994), retained the provision.
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D. Land Access and Site Selection
According to corporate officials in the U.S., Occidental's land
access policy in indigenous territories is clear: the company recog-
nizes and respects the right of indigenous peoples and communi-
ties to say "no" to oil development, and does not work in their
lands without their "permission" and "consent." In addition, the
company actively "supports indigenous land rights" in areas
where it operates, including efforts to secure legal land titles from
national governments.74 As stated, this standard coincides with
views that are commonly expressed by indigenous peoples, and
the aspirations of residents of Block 15. However, Occidental has
not committed to that standard in its legally binding documents
with Ecuador, and current land access and site selection standards
and practices appear to turn indigenous land and cultural rights
on their head.
The EMP is silent about standards and practices to gain access
to lands that the company wants to use. Occidental's Contract
with the government, however, effectively establishes a standard
of access by fiat. It provides that the national oil company,
Petroecuador, must "solicit and obtain from the Ministry of En-
ergy and Mines in a timely manner, upon petition from [Occiden-
tal] ... the expropriation in favor of Petroecuador, of lands.., that
may be needed to carry out the obligations" of Occidental under
the Contract.75 Occidental's practice of securing the expropriation
of lands for production facilities was confirmed to the author in an
interview with the company's chief attorney in Quito; however,
residents of Rio Jivino, Limoncocha, Pompeya and Itaya did not
learn that their lands had been expropriated until after the author
inquired about the practice. 76 Indeed, residents did not even
74. Telephone Interview with Lawrence Meriage, Vice President, Executive Services and
Public Affairs, Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation (Dec. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Meriage In-
terview 1]; and Telephone Interview with Lawrence Meriage, Vice President, Executive
Services and Public Affairs, Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation (Mar. 15, 1999) [hereinaf-
ter Meriage Interview 2].
75. Contract, supra note 31, 5.2.8.
76. Interview with Alberto Gomez de la Torre, Legal Representative-Legal Manager,
OEPC, Quito (July 23, 1999) [hereinafter Gomez Interview]. The author inquired about ex-
propriation after attending a meeting in Comuna El Eden in which residents learned that
community lands had been expropriated without their knowledge. In response to a ques-
tion about why Occidental had used expropriation, and rebuffed efforts by El Eden to ne-
gotiate a rental agreement for the land, Gomez argued that expropriation is the only legal
means to occupy land for oil production in Ecuador. When asked why alternative ar-
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know what expropriation was, until after the disclosures took
them by surprise. Similarly, they did not know that Petroecuador
owns land in their communities.
In Rio Jivino and Limoncocha, residents thought they had sold
land to Occidental. In Pompeya, where Occidental has two well
platforms and access roads, residents believed the community still
owned the lands. One platform contains production wells; the
other is the site of an exploratory well that, according to the com-
pany, is "dry." Residents were under the impression that Occi-
dental was renting the production site from the community and
occupying the other without permission. In Itaya, where land was
expropriated in 1997 for a road, and again in 1998 for a well site
and access road, there was considerable confusion about the nego-
tiations with Occidental and some of the "benefits." No one,
however, knew that land had been expropriated, and there ap-
peared to be a consensus that Occidental had attempted to buy
land, but the community had not consented to sell it.
Occidental's EIA fails to mention expropriation or consider pos-
sible socio-cultural impacts of the practice. In addition, although
the EIA includes three global statements about land tenure-
which recognize that a considerable, albeit inconsistent, propor-
tion of Block 15 is comprised of indigenous lands77-it does not
clearly disclose who owns the land at the locations where the
company works, or consider how the operations will impact land
tenure or indigenous cultures. At best, this is an egregious over-
sight for a company that says it is committed to respecting indige-
nous cultures and land rights. Access to work sites is a major
community relations issue for oil companies in Amazonia; it is
widely known that land tenure is critically important to indige-
nous peoples throughout the region, and the foundation of both
their survival as peoples and their prospects for sustainable de-
velopment.
It is difficult to believe, then, that this omission from the EIA
rangements had been made in Pompeya, where residents told the author they were renting
a well site to the company, Gomez disclosed that Occidental had followed the same proce-
dure at all production sites.
77. 1992 EIA, supra note 35. At 79-80, the EIA states that 61% of the lands in Block 15 are
"Indigenous Areas"; at 271 and 272, it states that 62% and 85%, respectively, of Block 15
have been legally adjudicated to indigenous groups. The numbers seem low because they
do not account for indigenous groups who use and occupy state-owned lands in protected
natural areas.
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and EMP is an oversight, and that the confusion in the affected
communities is an accident. A more likely explanation is that Oc-
cidental withheld the information from both local residents and
the public, as part of a general policy to conceal the company's
practice of securing the expropriation of lands for production op-
erations.78 That interpretation is supported by another vague
statement in the EIA, that the "occupation" of indigenous lands is"permitted and officially approved by the Ecuadorian State and
the indigenous organizations." 79 For the most part, the statement
is true with respect to the Ecuadorian State-Occidental's Con-
tract with Ecuador effectively obliges the State to expropriate
lands when Occidental so solicits, and officials in the Ministry of
Energy and Mines and Petroecuador are cognizant of the practice.
Officials in Ecuador's new Ministry of the Environment, however,
were not aware of the practice until the author asked them about
it in 1999. The Deputy Secretary of the agency characterized it as
a "very serious error," especially when communities are willing to
negotiate access agreements. He was surprised to learn that the
new Constitution does not prohibit expropriation of indigenous
lands, and said that a priority of the Ministry is to develop regula-
tions to implement the consultation rights of indigenous peoples
78. Similarly, expropriation is not mentioned in The Human Face of Petroleum; OXY, ISO
14001 CERTIFIED, supra note 42; Williams, 1997, supra note 24; HESMS GUIDANCE MANUAL,
supra note 45; or HESMS GUIDANCE FOR COMMUNITY RELATIONS, supra note 44.
79. The statement reads in full:
In order to develop its project, OEPC [Occidental] has had to occupy lands of the
comunas San Antonio, Indillana, and Pompeya of the Quichua group, and of families
who are also Quichua settled inside the boundaries of the Limoncocha Biological
Reserve in alluvial soils of the Napo River. In the future, if it is decided to build the
Central Production Station at the site that until now is so designated this will be
done in the lands of various indigenous landowners. Said occupation, although it is
permitted and officially approved by the Ecuadorian State and the indigenous or-
ganizations, means that the communities will have to live together with OEPC's
[Occidental's] petroleum activity and the possible environmental impacts that this
could generate, although some benefits are observed through the help they receive
for the improvement of social infrastructure and services.
1992 EIA, supra note 35, at 272-73.
The statement is confusing, because it does not mention community lands belonging to
either Comuna Rio Jivino or the Indigenous Association of Limoncocha, which were
among the first lands to be expropriated. (It may pre-date plans to occupy lands in
Comuna Itaya.) Residents say that Occidental does not have facilities in Comuna San An-
tonio. The reference to Indillana is also unclear-the platform and wells named "Indillana"
are located in Comuna Pompeya, and residents of neighboring Comuna Indillana believe
that the road in their community belongs to Repsol/YPF/Maxus, rather than Occidental.
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in the oil fields.80
With respect to indigenous organizations, the statement in the
EIA is misleading. The identity of the permitting organizations,
and the dates and terms of the permits, are not disclosed; nor is
the social and political organization of indigenous residents dis-
cussed in a meaningful way. Moreover, in every Quichua com-
munity where Occidental has located production facilities, except
Limoncocha, the occupied lands were legally titled to the commu-
nity. The communities are legally constituted comunas under Ec-
uadorian law, and titled lands are the collective property of all of
the inhabitants who comprise the comuna.8' Quichua comunas in
Block 15 are affiliated with several tiers of indigenous organiza-
tions, including FCUNAE, CONFENIAE, and CONAIE,82 but
those organizations do not have authority to grant permission to
companies to occupy community lands. Under Ecuador's Law of
Comunas, comunas elect community officials, or dirigentes,83 but
important decisions are traditionally made in assemblies, where
men and women gather to conduct the business of the comuna.
Most decisions are based on consensus. At the time the EIA was
prepared, Ecuadorian law authorized community dirigentes to rent
land for up to five years, but did not authorize the sale of commu-
nity lands.84
Limoncocha has a unique organization because of its distinct
history. It was founded in the 1950s by the Summer Institute of
Linguistics (SIL), a U.S.-based organization of evangelical Protes-
tant missionaries, that has worked to contact and "civilize" in-
digenous peoples and translate the Bible into native languages.
The missionaries brought indigenous Quichua to Limoncocha
from other areas to work with them. Together, they founded the
80. Interview with Jorge Alban, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of the Environment, Quito
(Aug. 19, 1999).
81. Law of Comunas, arts. 6 and 7, R.O. No.186 (Oct. 5, 1976) (Ecuador).
82. FCUNAE is comprised of 76 Quichua communities in the lower Napo area and, to-
gether with other Amazonian indigenous federations, forms part of CONFENIAE.
CONFENIAE is part of the national indigenous organization, Confederation of Indigenous
Organizations of Ecuador, CONAIE. A subsequent section of the 1992 EIA mentions four
indigenous organizations that "stand out" among the "nongovernmental organizations"
working in the area. CONFENIAE is listed, as well as a FOIN, a Quichua federation from
the upper Napo area, whose affiliated comunas are located outside of Block 15. Neither
FCUNAE nor CONAIE are mentioned. 1992 EIA, supra note 35, at 283.
83. Law of Comunas, supra note 81, art. 11.
84. Id. arts. 17(b), 21.
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Indigenous Organization of Limoncocha (OIL). After SIL was for-
mally expelled from Ecuador in 1981, residents reorganized OIL
into the Indigenous Association of Limoncocha (AIL). Limonco-
cha never became a comuna, and is now considered a pueblo, or vil-
lage. It is located on the edge of a lake-Lake Limoncocha-in
what is now Limoncocha Biological Reserve.85 Some lands in
Limoncocha are owned by AIL; other lands are owned by indi-
vidual Quichua.
In Amazonia, land access standards and practices are directly
related to site selection decisions by oil companies. Although Oc-
cidental's EMP is vague and incomplete in a number of important
respects, the opening pages of the document highlight five major
"design decisions" by the company meant to "reduce environ-
mental impacts."8 6 The first one relates to site selection standards
and practices, and provides that "production installations shall be
located far from populations around the Project."87
On its face, this sounds like a reasonable measure to protect in-
digenous communities because it could help minimize the intru-
sion, and reduce environmental and social impacts, on residents.
However, the basic information needed to implement and evalu-
ate the measure is not included in the EIA or EMP. The study
does not identify significant environmental and socio-cultural im-
pacts that could result from site selection decisions in Block 15,
evaluate alternative locations, or suggest-beyond this vague
statement-that those impacts were factors in decisions about
where to locate production facilities. The EIA does not even dis-
close precisely where production facilities are located in relation
to local communities, or include clear and complete information
about where people live, drink, hunt, fish, bathe, wash clothes and
dishes, garden, and gather natural resources. As a result, either
Occidental did not implement this measure in a reasoned and se-
rious way, or the company based implementation on information
that is not disclosed. A visit to Block 15 suggests that the measure
was applied inconsistently and superficially. Many facilities are
located near local populations, and operations in apparently re-
mote lands can also have major adverse impacts on the people.
85. Currently, AlL is comprised of residents of Limoncocha, and Quichua from nearby
comunas Itaya, Santa Elena and part of Rio Jivino.
86. EMP, supra note 58, at 2.
87. Id.
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Although most Quichua comunas have central areas where
schools, community centers and a few homes are located, those
areas are not major population centers. Homes and gardens are
dispersed; lands that do not have homes and gardens are mostly
forests and swamps, used by residents for hunting, fishing and
gathering. By Quichua standards, population density in the area
where production facilities are located is high, and virtually all of
the lands are used by people who live there. However, only Li-
moncocha has a central population center.
Occidental located CPF away from Limoncocha and other
homes. This helps reduce contact between oil workers and resi-
dents, which-to its credit-the company has tried to discourage.
However, the wells, roads, pipelines, and discharge site from the
sewage treatment facility at CPF are located in and around areas
with homes, and have created a number of problems and concerns
that have not been adequately addressed. Rio Jivino has been par-
ticularly hard hit by Occidental's siting decisions. The 40 hectares
selected for CPF was the community's most important hunting
area. It was also a "reserve" that they were protecting for their
children. Inexplicably, the EIA does not identify the location of
CPF.88 According to residents, Occidental knew that the site was
their hunting area and reserve before it built CPF because they
tried to persuade the company to find another location.
Residents learned about plans for the site when Occidental ap-
proached community dirigentes with a proposal to "buy" the land.
At the time, the land was legally titled to the comuna. Occidental
did not ask for permission to work in the community and people
there did not believe that saying "no" to the operations was an op-
tion. Residents did, however, initially refuse to sell the reserve
because of the importance of the area to them. They implored Oc-
cidental to find another site, but the company insisted and even-
tually wore down resistance to the sale in the comuna. With prom-
ises of jobs, transportation, food, fiestas, and other benefits,
Occidental first convinced the president of Rio Jivino to sell, and
in turn he convinced the others.
88. Instead, it includes a vague and misleading statement. See supra note 79. This also
raises serious questions about the adequacy of the EIA and the rationality and legitimacy of
the approval process. How can a meaningful environmental and social impact study be
prepared by Occidental and approved by the government without identifying the location
of the principal production facility?
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Many people now believe that it was a mistake to sell their land.
In the words of one community leader:
The company always goes around offering, and with those things it
tricks us. They take hold of dirigentes, and give them transportation,
money and food, and then the dirigentes convince the people to ap-
prove what the company wants, by telling us that the company va a
hacer la maravilla por siempre [will work wonders forever] .... Now
we have problems .... The people are always confused [about the
company].
Another explained the decision to sell by saying that Occidental"compro consciencia," bought consciences in the community, "in
exchange for alcohol, fiestas, food and rides in company vehicles."
Occidental promised residents that it would not operate like
Texaco and Petroecuador. To prevent pollution, it would use cut-
ting edge technology. Occidental convinced people that they
would be better off if they negotiated alone with the company-
Occidental would take care of their needs, they were told, so they
did not need any help from environmental or indigenous organi-
zations. Those groups, said the company, claim to represent af-
fected communities and speak in their name; but they use resi-
dents' hardships to get money for themselves, and seek to
appropriate benefits that rightfully belong to the comunas. The
communities, said Occidental, are perfectly capable of represent-
ing themselves. Why should they share their benefits with groups
who are not directly affected? The company paid Rio Jivino
40,000,000 sucres for the 40 hectares, an amount of money that had"never been seen before" in the community, but is now worth U.S.
$1,600. Although residents of Rio Jivino thought they were selling
their land to the company, as discussed supra, Occidental solicited,
and secured, expropriation of the land in favor of Petroecuador, so
that it could work the site regardless of the wishes of the people.
For several years, Occidental provided assistance to Rio Jivino.
Among other things, it built a community center and school with
a dining area, and funded courses and community projects. It
gave away umbrellas and tanks for collecting rain water. Rela-
tions between the company and the community were "good." But
after the operations were up and running-and had been show-
cased in press tours and The Human Face of Petroleum-the com-
pany changed. According to residents, Occidental gradually
withdrew its assistance, and most people now feel that they have
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been "botada," thrown away by the company.89 One group de-
scribed Occidental as "mesquinoso"-"it has the most beautiful
houses but does not share." Company trucks no longer give peo-
ple rides when they pass on the roads. Jobs are few and tempo-
rary, notwithstanding a statement in the EIA that cites the genera-
tion of employment, with "preference" for local residents, as "one
of the beneficial impacts" on indigenous residents. 90 Lately, the
company has refused requests for "collaboration" with commu-
nity projects, despite a promise to fund two projects proposed by
the community every year. Occidental did not keep its promises,
people say, and now only a favored few receive any benefits from
the operations. Many feel that they were "engafiada," tricked by
the company.
Many people also believe that it was a mistake to negotiate
alone with the company, without help from "people who know
the laws." For years, they have felt weak and isolated. Some
people think that they no longer have much right to protest be-
cause the land where Occidental operates belongs to the company,
so, for the most part, it can do as it pleases. Residents who go to
CPF to present grievances to the company, propose projects for
assistance, or discuss environmental or social concerns, are told to
wait outside the fenced area, usually for hours. Only a favored
few are consistently "atendidos," received by the company. When
residents complain about discharges into streams and rivers,91
89. This is inconsistent with the standard in the EMP, that community assistance "will
be a permanent labor by OEPC [Occidental] during the life" of the operations. EMP, supra
note 58 at 72.
90. 1992 EIA, supra note 35, at 265. Most jobs for indigenous residents are temporary,
and include labor in forests and swamps during seismic studies or construction activities;
few Quichua work at production facilities. Occidental has also contracted with communi-
ties to maintain platforms and roads. The platform maintenance contract is rotated annu-
ally among seven comunas. In 1999, Occidental told residents of Rio Jivino and Limoncocha
that it would not renew their road maintenance contract because it no longer has money to
maintain the road. Additionally, some Shuar have jobs at the landfill in their community.
91. In addition to sewage effluent, kitchen wastes and an intermittent, unidentified
waste stream are discharged into the Jivino River. Runoff from CPF is discharged into
smaller waters. According to residents, the runoff is sometimes visibly contaminated with
oily wastes. Although they clearly acknowledge that the visible pollution is notably less
than the pollution in other areas where Texaco-Petroecuador facilities are located, many
people are nonetheless concerned about the operations, and expect "more problems and
illnesses" in the future. A common complaint is that Occidental no longer informs resi-
dents about the operations, or allows them to participate in monitoring. Initially, Occiden-
tal invited residents to observe its activities on a regular basis.
Corporate officials commonly claim that there are no discharges, but this is clearly not
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their concerns are belittled, and they are told that all discharges
are "purified" and clean enough to drink. If they insist, and say
the wastes contain oils or crude, Occidental challenges them, and
demands technical documentation to prove the complaint.92 At
the same time, the company refuses to disclose information to ver-
ify its environmental assurances or even to fully disclose the stan-
dards for the operations. Until the author's visit in 1999 to con-
duct research on standards and practices in Block 15, Oxy had not
attended a community assembly in Rio Jivino or neighboring Li-
moncocha for two years. This was surprising because the com-
pany has long used those communities as poster children for its
community relations and contribution to sustainable develop-
ment, and continues to proffer them as model programs. Many
residents attributed the sudden willingness of Occidental to"show its face" and meet with them after ignoring them for so
long to the author's research. 93
Although Rio Jivino has been particularly hard hit by the loss of
its hunting grounds and other impacts, residents in Limoncocha,
Itaya and Pompeya report similar practices and concerns. A for-
mer dirigente in Limoncocha explained: "At first, the company al-
ways came around, offering. They came with pretty words, say-
ing they will help. But lately we are almost abandoned." In Rio
Jivino, a former dirigente echoed those views, when he described
the company's general pattern of practices and relations with the
Quichua:
At first, relations with the company were good. But now all of the
true, and there is considerable confusion about the scope of waste injection practices. Cor-
porate officials consistently maintain that all produced water is re-injected underground;
however, that could not be confirmed and there is anecdotal evidence that at least some
produced water is still discharged into the environment. Moreover, although reinjection
could represent a significant improvement in environmental performance, it can also lead
to new problems. Unless injection wells are properly designed, constructed, operated and
maintained, waste injection can contaminate groundwater. Currently, there is no inde-
pendent evaluation of Occidental's injection practices or environmental performance.
92. In addition to disrespecting residents, this raises serious questions about compliance
with Occidental's corporate policy to inform local communities, engage in dialogue with
them, and respond to concerns. Residents in other Quichua communities also reported that
Occidental has assured them that all wastes are "purified" to drinking water quality before
discharge, and demanded "technical data" to support complaints about pollution.
93. In Quito, corporate officials expressed considerable anger toward the author for vis-
iting communities in Block 15, and accused her of "creating problems and expectations"
there. Prior to the visit, U.S.-based officials said they have an "excellent relationship" with
communities in the area. Meriage Interview 2, supra note 74.
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comunas are in disagreement with the company. With small obras
[works], it won the friendship of the dirigentes, and convinced the
people; se hace conformistas [people become conformists]. Now, it is
abandoning the friendship, little by little. People are molestas [up-
set]. The company has not complied with the agreements. We were
like children with candy. Now the company does not help at all, ex-
cept it gives a little money to the dirigentes. The coordination is lost.
Community relations do not exist anymore .... Now the company
ignores us. Before, it conversed, and had a dialogue with us. If we
protest, the company will call the fuerza publica [Ecuadorian mili-
tary].
For the most part, the projects in Rio Jivino and Limoncocha
that are showcased in The Human Face of Petroleum and Oil and Gas
Journal have ended. For example, the video highlights three "self-
management success stories": chicken farms managed by women;
a carpentry project in Rio Jivino; and a handicraft project in Li-
moncocha. 94 The carpentry project is also described in Oil and Gas
Journal as an example of Occidental's "micro-enterprise initiative"
to develop "sustainable small businesses that boost the local econ-
omy." The article reports that the carpentry project "has increased
community income while producing low-cost wood products.
That, in turn, creates a forum for how to better use local re-
sources."95 According to residents, Occidental built a "house" for
the project, and gave them tools, an electric generator and a fence.
But after they worked the first logs, no additional materials were
provided, so no further work was done, and the workshop has
been abandoned.
The poultry farms are described in the article as an initiative
that, together with community and family fish farms, has enabled
local communities "to develop a more diversified economy while
providing a healthier diet with more sources of protein." 96 Ac-
cording to residents in Rio Jivino, Occidental gave them chickens
and sheds to house them, but no feed. A few years ago, they sold
all of the chickens, and the project ended. In Limoncocha, the pro-
ject reportedly ended because of poor administration by the diri-
gentes-it ran out of funds after dirigentes used project monies to
make loans to themselves. The women ate some of the chickens
94. The Human Face of Petroleum. The video also showcases Occidental's relations with
the Shuar in Yamanunka.
95. Williams 1997, supra note 24 at 47. Some of these themes are echoed in the video.
96. Id. at 48. The video similarly claims that the poultry projects have generated income
and nutrition for families.
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and sold the rest in the community. Residents in both communi-
ties say they do not have family fish farms supported by the com-
pany; however, there is a fish farm at the agricultural demonstra-
tion farm that was established but subsequently abandoned by
Occidental. 97 Residents describe the project as "mas o menos,"
more or less, because it does not provide them with much income
or food. They say the company controls distribution of the fish,
and residents are allowed to eat them only during community
work projects. Some fish are reportedly also sold by dirigentes.
The handicraft enterprise in Limoncocha is not mentioned in the
article; however, the video calls it a "success story" that generates
income for residents by selling their products "in the national
market."98 Residents say Occidental gave them a "house" for the
project, but did not give them tools. The project has ended, with-
out selling in the national market. Currently, they say, there are
no micro-enterprises in the community. As for the "more than
19,000 man-hr" of "adult training programs in carpentry, agricul-
ture, leadership skills, administration, mechanics, and other sub-
jects" provided by company and reported in Oil and Gas Journal,99
residents say they "have not calculated," but the courses have
ended. One woman, a former dirigente, said that the courses had
generated considerable interest, but after a few weeks people for-
got what they had learned because of the absence of follow up ac-
tivities.
Local histories of other community projects, as recounted to the
author, are similar. Occidental helped initially, especially with in-
frastructure, but now the company either ignores most requests
for assistance or says it no longer has money for projects. In Li-
moncocha, for example, Occidental recently said that it could no
longer provide medicines or much support for education because
"the government is in crisis, and has cut the budget for education
and health." This illustrates a common practice by the company,
in which it deflects criticism by denying responsibility for contro-
versial practices and decisions, attributing all responsibility and
decision-making power to Ecuador's government or Petroecua-
97. A project financed by the European Union, Petromas, resumed operation of the
farm. Many people are under the impression that Occidental still operates the farm, which
is also showcased in the video and article.
98. The Human Face of Petroleum.
99. Williams 1997, supra note 24, at 47.
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dor.100
Notwithstanding this, Oil and Gas Journal gives Occidental credit
for "dramatic gains in public health in the Limoncocha area." The
article says that "[m]alnutrition among children has almost dis-
appeared. And infant mortality has dropped to zero." Several
projects are credited, including the training of community health
promoters, improvements in sanitation, pre- and post-natal care,
school breakfasts, and "the creation of a self-supporting local
pharmacy." 101 The article does not mention the destruction of the
Rio Jivino hunting grounds or impacts on the food supply in Li-
moncocha, where residents say they have lost hunting areas to
well sites and roads. Doctors in the region say that "zero infant
mortality" is impossible; residents of Limoncocha say three chil-
dren died in the year after the article was published. Increasingly,
residents in both communities are expressing concerns about their
health. Before, they say, Occidental trained health promoters and
provided medicines and breakfasts for children, but those projects
have ended. The pharmacy had a particularly unfortunate end-
ing. It was staffed by "a doctor from the company," but he re-
portedly disappeared "without saying goodbye," leaving an
8,000,000 sucre debt to AIL (currently worth $320).
One project that continues to receive support from Occidental is
a training institute for bilingual professors in Limoncocha. In ad-
dition, Ecuador's government has maintained a child care center
in Limoncocha that was started by the company. However, in
1999, residents blamed Occidental for an "epidemic" among chil-
dren in the center. They say the company used a tank truck that
sprays contaminated water on roads for dust control purposes, to
give water to the children. At the time, corporate officials in Quito
refused to discuss community relations, but in an interview about
environmental practices they insisted that the company uses only
clean groundwater on its roads.
In addition to feelings of betrayal by the company, residents in
Rio Jivino do not have anywhere to hunt in their own community.
Hunting and other subsistence activities not only are fundamental
to the health, nutrition and well-being of indigenous peoples, but
also are important factors in the maintenance of their cultures and
economic self-reliance. In Rio Jivino, an important element of the
100. This belies Occidental's actual power, as the operator of Block 15.
101. Williams 1997, supra note 24, at 48.
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local subsistence economy has been destroyed, and people say
they now eat more food "from outside." Among other impacts,
this has made them more dependent on a wage economy, in an
area where jobs are scarce. 10 2 As a general matter, people say they
eat less meat. To replace the protein in their diet, they have in-
creased fishing activities, especially in Lake Limoncocha. Resi-
dents of Limoncocha have also reportedly stepped up fishing in
the lake, after losing local hunting areas to well sites and roads.
This may be putting some stress on fisheries in the lake and, con-
sequently, could create conflict between Limoncocha and its
neighbors. Some Rio Jivino residents expressed concern about
"talk" in Limoncocha that the community might try to ban them
from fishing in the lake.
There is also cause for concern about possible health impacts
from eating fish from Lake Limoncocha. In a brief discussion of
baseline chemical data, Occidental's EIA reports that samples at
one location in the lake show the presence of high levels of heavy
metals, far in excess of ambient water standards. The ETA implies
that the pollution was caused by Metropolitan Touring, a nature
tour operator that formerly used a dock near the sample site; and
further implies that the contaminants are contained in a "closed"
area of the lake.103 This is misleading because the area Occidental
refers to is a neck of the lake, but it is not closed off or contained in
any way. In addition, a table of data included in the EIA, but not
discussed in detail in the text, reveals that the heavy metals that
were found in the lake-arsenic, barium, cobalt, copper, lead,
nickel, vanadium and zinc-are all contaminants that are typically
associated with oil drilling. The table also shows that most of the
same metals-as well as cadmium, mercury, silver and beryl-
hum-were found at another site. Although the location is not
disclosed with precision, it appears to be somewhere in the
swampy forests of Limoncocha Biological Reserve, in the vicinity
of Occidental's Laguna wells. 04 In addition, high levels of chro-
102. The lack of jobs at production facilities is a major complaint of many male resi-
dents, who say they were promised jobs by Occidental.
103. 1992 EIA, supra note 35, at 98.
104. In the lake, arsenic was found at 10.4 parts per million (ppm); lead at 45.6 ppm; co-
balt at 40.6 ppm; nickel at 33.2 ppm; zinc at 218 ppm; copper at 242 ppm; vanadium at 80
ppm; and barium at 826 ppm. In the swamp, beryllium was found at 8.2 ppm; cadmium at
24.8 ppm; cobalt at 231 ppm; copper at 158 ppm; lead at 20.3 ppm; mercury at 1.04 ppm;
nickel at 145 ppm; silver at 14.1 ppm; zinc at 988 ppm; and barium at 4,310 ppm. 1992 EIA,
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mium and nickel were found in two species of plants in the
lake. 05
Lake Limoncocha is an oxbow lake, created when the Napo
River changed course. The centerpiece of the reserve, it is still pe-
riodically fed by the river during heavy rains. One such rain oc-
curred while Occidental was drilling the first Laguna exploratory
well at a site in the reserve. The drill site (and surrounding forest)
became flooded, and operations were temporarily halted as the
company fled the area. Residents who went to hunt in the flooded
forest just after the rains reported seeing drums and other con-
tainers of chemicals that had been washed into the swamp from
the drill site [hereinafter Laguna Spill]. While the data in the EIA
are too limited to be conclusive, there is no question that they are
significant, and it is considerably more likely that the pollution in
the lake was caused by the Laguna Spill than by tourism. None-
theless, the EIA does not disclose the spill.106
In addition, even though the levels of contaminants in both the
lake and the swamp raise serious ecological and health concerns,
both sampling sites have apparently been abandoned by Occiden-
tal. Neither site is included in the water monitoring program in
supra note 35 at 96-97. For contaminants that are governed by Ecuador's water pollution
regulations, these levels are 43.6 to 98,800 times greater than water quality standards for
human consumption and the protection of flora and fauna.
Ecuador's water quality standards for water that requires "only disinfection" prior to
use for domestic consumption, expressed in mg/i (ppm) are: 0.05 for arsenic; 1.0 for bar-
ium; 0.01 for cadmium; 1.0 for copper; 0.05 for lead; 0.002 for mercury; 0.05 for silver; and
5.0 for zinc. For flora and fauna in cold fresh water, expressed in ppm, they are: 0.1 for ar-
senic; 0.1 for barium; 0.1 for beryllium; 0.01 for cadmium; 0.1 for copper; 0.01 for lead; 0.01
for mercury; 0.01 for nickel; 0.01 for silver; and 0.01 for zinc. Regulations for the Preven-
tion and Control of Environmental Contamination Related to Water Resources, R.O. No.
204 (June 5, 1989) (Ecuador) at arts. 18, 19, 25.
In the U.S., EPA National Primary Drinking Water Regulations establish maximum con-
taminant levels for drinking water. Those levels (in ppm) are: 0.05 for arsenic; 2.0 for bar-
ium; 0.004 for beryllium; 0.005 for cadmium; 1.3 for copper; 0.015 for lead (with a goal of 0);
0.002 for mercury. 40 C.F.R. § 141.23. In New York, State Public Health Law regulations
include some additional standards (in ppm): 0.1 for nickel; 0.1 for silver; and 5.0 for zinc.
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 5-1.52 (2002). For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling
2001a, supra note 22, at 361-65.
105. These contaminants, both carcinogens, are also associated with oil drilling. Chro-
mium levels are reported at 0.015% and 0.0003% dry weight; nickel levels are 0.03% and
0.004%. 1992 EIA, supra note 35, at 97.
106. Similarly, corporate officials who were asked about accidental spills for this study
did not disclose the Laguna Spill. The author learned about it because she was working in
the region at the time (July 1991), and residents told her about the chemicals in the swamp.
The samples were taken by a contractor for Occidental in August 1991. Id.
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the EMP,107 and Occidental did not inform residents about the
data. According to residents in Limoncocha, Occidental studied
the lake "by itself" and told them that the water is "bien," good.
Moreover, notwithstanding the multiple violations of water qual-
ity standards, Occidental reportedly told Ecuadorian officials who
currently manage Limoncocha Biological Reserve that-based on
the company's sampling-water quality in the lake is "good," and
the only contaminants of concern are coliforms that come from
dormitory sewage at the teachers' training institute in Limonco-
cha.108
It is difficult to interpret Occidental's failure to disclose or con-
sider the Laguna Spill, and the limited scope of relevant monitor-
ing in the EMP, as anything other than an attempt to cover it up,
and quietly create a record that could be used to blame Metropoli-
tan Touring for pollution in the lake, should the need arise. This
is particularly egregious because the lake is an important fishing
area for people from not only Rio Jivino and Limoncocha, but also
other communities. People of all ages fish day and night. Heavy
metals persist in the environment, and many metals are known to
accumulate in the food chain. They could potentially pose a
health risk to residents who eat fish from the lake, and threaten
wildlife. 109 The lake is also an important resource for tourism de-
velopment. 110 In addition to raising serious questions about Occi-
dental's ethics and environmental performance, the data suggest
that even when precautions are taken in the oil patch, single inci-
dents can occur-even during exploratory drilling-that have far-
reaching and longstanding consequences in a rainforest environ-
ment, and harsh impacts on local communities. Occidental's fail-
ure to disclose, investigate and remedy the Laguna Spill shows
107. EMP, supra note 58, at 20. The EMP does not include any sampling of sediments or
contaminants in flora or fauna.
108. Occidental reportedly refused an oral request by the Area Chief (the official from
the Ministry of the Environment who resides in the reserve) to review the company's
chemical sampling data from the lake, citing a Petroecuador confidentiality policy.
109. In 1998, Limoncocha Biological Reserve (where both the lake and contaminated
swamp are located) was designated a Wetland of International Importance under the Con-
vention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar
Convention). Officials in Ecuador's Ministry of the Environment who worked to designate
the site, and residents, were not aware of the data until the author brought it to their atten-
tion.
110. Tourism there has decreased in recent years, but could potentially be revived in the
future; if properly managed, it could offer a sustainable development alternative.
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how easy it is for companies to hide environmental problems in
remote areas, and paint a veneer of corporate responsibility and
sustainable development."'
Overall, then, most residents currently feel that they do not
share in the benefits of oil production, and many say their quality
of life has been diminished, rather than improved, by oil devel-
opment. In the words of a former president of Rio Jivino:
With experience, the resentment is growing stronger. Because of
our health-we have new diseases but we do not have medicines.
The company does not want to help; there is not much community
relations. In environmental matters, we are blind, and there are no
jobs for most of us .... Before, we lived better, more tranquilo [tran-
quil]. There was no noise or dust. Now it is not even dark at night.
And the animals, where are they?. ..The majority of people here do
not feel that they share in the benefits, and, more and more, we are
concerned about our health and because we have less food.
The major fishing area in Rio Jivino is the Jivino River. That
river has been polluted by plantations of African Palm located
upriver, and from Texaco and Petroecuador. However, it is still
an important natural resource for the people. Residents fish and
bathe in the river, and in some areas people drink its waters; but
Occidental discharges effluent from the sewage treatment facilities
at CPF directly into the river, at a location in the community near
homes and bathing areas. Not surprisingly, residents-who were
not consulted about the location of the discharge site or informed
about the wastes that are poured into the river-are concerned
that the company may be further degrading the quality of the wa-
ter. In another gross omission, Occidental's EIA does not disclose
the location of the discharge or the quantity and chemical compo-
sition of the waste stream, nor does it include meaningful baseline
water quality data from the river or an assessment of its assimila-
tion capacity. The EMP does include a list of five quantitative
chemical standards for sewage discharges;112 however, a statement
of concentration standards is not enough to make a good analysis
of the consequences of the discharge for the environment.
111. Of the ten "guiding principles" highlighted in Occidental's glossy HESMS
GUIDANCE MANUAL, at least two appear to have been disregarded in the wake of the La-
guna Spill. Principle 7 provides for prompt remediation; principle 8 provides that mem-
bers of the "public who may be affected will be informed about relevant health, safety or
environmental issues related to our facilities in a timely manner." HESMS GUIDANCE
MANUAL, supra note 45, at 7.
112. EMP, supra note 58, at 29.
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The EIA can be read to suggest that impacts on water quality in
the Jivino are not significant because the river is already polluted
from other sources. That conclusion, however, is arbitrary be-
cause baseline water quality and possible impacts on it are not as-
sessed.113 Moreover, that approach to environmental protection is
not consistent with responsible practice, and is callous to the
needs and concerns of residents who depend on the river. Further
degradation could virtually "kill" the river, and seriously harm
the livelihood, health and well being of the people. It would also
violate the spirit of a number of provisions in Ecuadorian law that
generally prohibit pollution that degrades water quality 1 4
In addition to questions and concern about the ongoing sewage
effluent discharge into the river, residents have reported mysteri-
ous itinerant discharges, that begin "violently." They have also
expressed concern about the possible impact of a waste injection
well located close to the river, and want to know how they can
know if injected wastes are entering the river.
E. Self Regulation and the Privatization of Environmental Law
Ecuador's constitutional and statutory law clearly recognize the
public interest in a clean and healthy environment and charge the
State with environmental protection responsibilities. However,
despite a clear trend on paper toward increasingly detailed-
albeit incomplete--environmental requirements, implementation,
oversight and compliance remain poor. Successive governments
have failed to implement meaningful environmental regulation in
the oil fields. For example, oil exploration and production gener-
113. This reflects a general pattern, in which the EIA paints a vague picture of general-
ized environmental degradation throughout Block 15, identifies multiple sources of pollu-
tion, and seems to imply that areas affected by other activities do not require careful pro-
tection. This is misleading because Block 15 includes not only a wealth of natural resources
that provide secure and self-reliant sources of food, water, medicine, and shelter for resi-
dents, but also vast tracts of intact rainforest and wetlands. For example, the 56,000 hectare
Pafiacocha Protected Forest is a spectacular wetland, with a blackwater river system, la-
goons, swamps and flooded forests. It is home to at least twenty endangered or threatened
species of fauna, including Amazon River Dolphin, Common Woolly Monkey, jaguar and
paiche. E-mail from Randall Smith to Judith Kimerling (June 22, 2000) (copy on file with
author). The area is particularly vulnerable to pollution because it is a low energy system,
with limited flushing to remove contaminants; in addition, oil field noise can have adverse
impacts on wildlife.
114. For a discussion of Ecuadorian environmental law, see Kimerling 2001a, supra note
22.
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ate large quantities of wastes with toxic constituents, yet in prac-
tice the government does not even require operators to character-
ize, record or report the nature, volume or destiny of the wastes
they discharge, dump or bury in the environment. As in the Oc-
cidental case study, government officials routinely approve EIAs
and EMPs by TNCs without significant modification, despite seri-
ous inadequacies. The implementation of environmental law has
been hindered by the absence of political will, a lack of resources
and technical capacity, the failure of the rule of law and good
governance generally, and resistence by industry to regulation.
There is nothing new, then, about environmental self-regulation
by international oil companies. Ecuador's longstanding failure to
implement environmental regulation has effectively allowed
companies to set the standards for their operations and police
themselves. At the Earth Summit, the general failure of govern-
ments in developing countries to act to protect the environment
was recognized as a serious problem; in response, Ecuador and
other governments pledged to change course, and implement na-
tional law to protect the environment. Currently, proponents of
globalization argue that free trade helps developing nations do
this, by exporting international standards and strengthening de-
mocratic institutions and the rule of law, including environmental
law.
The Occidental case study, however, reveals a radical new de-
velopment in environmental law in Ecuador. The company's
Contract with Ecuador includes provisions that establish an envi-
ronmental law framework for Block 15. Negotiated behind closed
doors, the new legal regime seems designed to perpetuate and
even legalize the exclusive reliance on corporate environmental
self regulation. Whereas self regulation historically occurred be-
cause of inaction by the State, in Occidental's current Contract, the
government effectively cedes authority to the company to set en-
vironmental standards for the operations, without public disclo-
sure, review and approval by government officials, participation
by affected groups, or other democratic safeguards. In effect, the
State has contracted environmental protection to Occidental, along
with oil exploration and production activities; this represents the
privatization of environmental law."5 As a matter of national pol-
115. Kirnerling 2001a, supra note 22.
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icy, the new legal regime has not been publicly disclosed and de-
bated in Ecuador. This raises serious questions of law, legitimacy
and accountability, and could operate to undermine democracy,
good governance, and the rule of law in Ecuador, in addition to
presenting environmental and social risks.
1. Environmental Management Plan
The privatization of environmental law in Block 15 is anchored
in the use of Occidental's EMP as a legal standard for environ-
mental protection." 6 According to Occidental, the government-
approved EMP "collates all regulatory, mitigation and standards
practices" that apply to the operations." 7 Notwithstanding this,
the document does not provide a clear and complete portrait of
the company's standards, practices and operations. At the same
time, it includes some troubling details and, when read with the
Contract, indicates that Ecuador has not only failed to regulate
environmental protection in Block 15, but also quietly-and arbi-
trarily-ceded rule-making authority to a private company to
regulate itself.
The EMP begins with a statement that makes it clear whose
document it is, and who is in control:
Environmental protection is one of the highest priorities that Occi-
dental Exploration and Production Company (OEPC) has included
in the design of its operations and as such the environmental factor
has been considered in the decision-making in order to reduce the
impacts on the environment.118
The decision-making process and rationale are not explained,
116. Occidental's Contract with Ecuador includes a section on environmental protec-
tion, in the segment entitled "Obligations of the Contractor [Occidental]." The opening
provision of that section obliges Occidental "to preserve the existing ecological balance" in
the area where it operates, "for which its actions shall be governed by the Environmental
Management Plan and the pertinent regulations that are in effect in the country." Contract,
supra note 31 5.1.20.1. The definitions in the Contract define "Environmental Manage-
ment Plan" as Occidental's 1992 EMP. Id. '13.3.35. In Spanish, the use of the present tense
in the reference to Ecuadorian regulations, instead of the subjunctive or future tense, is am-
biguous. It could be interpreted to mean that, throughout the life of the Contract, the com-
pany's obligation will be governed by the (1992 EMP and) environmental regulations that
were in effect at the time the Contract was signed. As a general matter, those regulations
are weak and vague; notwithstanding this, if meaningful environmental regulations are
adopted by Ecuador in the future, Occidental could argue that it is not required to comply
with them. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling 2001a, supra note 22 at pp. 304-65.
117. Hull e-mail, supra note 59.
118. EMP, supra note 58, at 2.
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and the document continues with a list of six measures that are"among the decisions made for the design" of production opera-
tions. They include: locating production facilities far from popu-
lations (discussed supra); drilling directional wells; re-injecting
formation water; using impermeable pits for drilling muds; bury-
ing flow lines; and limiting the width of roads. The plan does not
explain why these measures were selected or how they will be
implemented; instead, it states that the EMP has been designed
"in order to guarantee the mechanisms that ensure that an ade-
quate consideration of environmental factors will be given during
the development of the Project."" 9 This statement is confusing
because, presumably, environmental factors have already been
considered during the EIA process. Under Ecuadorian law, envi-
ronmental management plans should detail the precise measures
and practices that will be used to prevent and mitigate adverse
impacts, including monitoring. The introduction to Occidental's
EMP, however, suggests a "figure-it-out-as-we-go-along" ap-
proach to environmental planning, implementation and oversight.
A review of the document confirms that Occidental is unwilling
to commit to a comprehensive set of clear standards and practices
in the EMP. Instead, it makes a number of general commitments,
that leave the company with considerable leeway in how to inter-
pret and implement them. For example, the initial list of five "de-
sign decisions" is followed by a long table that summarizes poten-
tial impacts from the operations and lists measures that should be
taken to mitigate them. One of the mitigating measures, to pre-
vent the degradation of surface waters, is that Occidental "will es-
tablish quality standards for all discharges based on Ecuadorian
norms or applicable regulations in the United States."1 20
Another mitigating measure includes some detail but clearly
has not been implemented. It provides that Occidental "will
maintain open and cooperative relations with the communities,
including the dissemination of the EMP among the communities
in the area of influence of the Project."121 During a visit to Block 15
in 1999, the author was present on three occasions when residents
119. Id. at 3.
120. Other important-but equally vague-measures include "treatment" of wastes,
"control of runoff," and "monitoring and follow-up of the quality of effluents and receiving
waters." EMP, supra note 58, at 5-7. For a fuller discussion of the EMP, see Kimerling
2001a, supra note 22.
121. EMP, supra note 58, at 7.
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asked company officials for a copy of the environmental man-
agement plan that governs operations in their communities. On
each occasion, the company's representatives responded by say-
ing that they were not authorized to distribute the document.
When pressed, they advised the community to request it, and any
other information they might seek, from the appropriate authori-
ties. On each occasion a different authority was cited. 122
The table in the EMP is followed by a summary discussion of
plans and programs for environmental management. Although
some important details are included, the plans are by no means
comprehensive, and many important standards and practices are
vague and unclear. For example, there is no clear and complete
statement of the quantity, chemical composition and destiny of
the waste streams and emissions that are generated by the opera-
tions. Similarly, the precise locations where wastes are buried,
and where effluents and emissions are released into the environ-
ment, are not disclosed.
In addition, a number of key assessments and decisions are ex-
122. The authorities included Petroecuador, Occidental Ecuador's General Manager,
and a community relations supervisor. On one occasion the request related to planned op-
erations, but the response was similar. The responses reflect two general patterns of prac-
tices observed during the study: (1) in response to requests for information, Occidental nei-
ther denied the requests nor provided the information; instead, people were instructed to
request the information again, and the procedures and authorizations demanded by the
company seemed to change arbitrarily; and (2) company officials denied responsibility for
withholding information by attributing decision-making power to others.
Subsequently, the author obtained the EMP and the 1992 EIA from a new archive in the
Ministry of Energy and Mines; after that, Occidental provided her (but not affected com-
munities) with a copy. That was more than 1.5 years after she first wrote to the company to
request information for academic research about international standards and practices in
Block 15. Most of the environmental information requested from Occidental for the study
has not been provided. For an account of efforts to get the information, see Kimerling
2001a, supra note 22, at 356-57.
The Contract includes a confidentiality clause that requires the parties to obtain written
authorization from the other party before disclosing any "technical for] economic informa-
tion" to third parties. Contract, supra note 31, 9J 5.5.5 and 5.4.4. Environmental informa-
tion is not mentioned; Occidental claims that it is included. However, applying the provi-
sion to environmental information would be constitutionally suspect, especially if it is used
to withhold information from affected residents. It would also be questionable under in-
ternational law and Ecuador's Law of Modernization. See supra notes 8-10 and accompany-
ing text; supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text; Law of Modernization of the State, Pri-
vatizations, and Private Initiative to Render Public Services, art. 32, R.O. No. 349 (Dec. 31,
1993) (Ecuador) (public access to public documents unless prohibited by special laws);
General Regulations for the Law of Modernization of the State, Privatizations, and Private
Initiative to Render Public Services, art. 20, R.O. No. 411 (Mar. 31, 1994) (Ecuador) (public
officials must facilitate access to documents).
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plicitly and inexplicably left for the future, including: the location
and technical specifications for one, and possibly two, solid waste
landfills to be built and operated by the company;123 the location
of sites to mine sand and gravel for construction activities; the"concentration of contaminants [that will be] liberated into the
environment" when effluents are discharged into surface waters;
the baseline water quality in receiving waters; and the frequency
of chemical sampling for monitoring activities.124 The information
that is needed to make those determinations is precisely the kind
of information that should be gathered, disclosed and assessed in
the EIA. Its omission not only raises serious questions about the
adequacy of the impact assessment, but also suggests that envi-
ronmental considerations are more an afterthought than an inte-
gral part of project planning. If important baseline data is gath-
ered and standards are set after the EIA and EMP have been
approved, how can the possible environmental impacts of the pro-
ject be assessed in a meaningful way and integrated into project
planning?125
Presumably, these and other future "determinations" will be
made internally by Occidental, which is assigned "exclusive re-
sponsibility" for many of the programs and activities in the EMP,
including the waste management, monitoring, and oversight pro-
grams. 126 In addition to major gaps in baseline information and
applicable standards and practices, the EMP is written in a way
that repeatedly anticipates the re-adjustment of standards and
practices. 27 Although a certain amount of review and adjustment
can be expected for any "new model"of oil field operations, the
EMP appears to allow this far beyond any reasonable need and,
most importantly, does not provide for transparency, consulta-
tion, or government oversight as standard-setting and other envi-
ronmental decision-making by the company proceeds. The result
is a striking lack of clarity about the standards, practices, and
123. In a troubling disclosure, the EMP states that leachate from the landfill will be col-
lected, passed through an "inspection box," and then discharged into the Napo or Jivino
rivers, at an undisclosed location. EMP, supra note 58 at 48. Both rivers are important natu-
ral resources for local communities.
124. EMP, supra note 58, at 17-18.
125. These deficiencies also raise questions about the adequacy and legitimacy of the
EIA approval process by Ecuador's government.
126. EMP, supra note 58, at 10.
127. See, e.g., id. at 16.
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oversight of the company's operations. This murkiness makes it
impossible to verify Occidental's claims of environmental excel-
lence or even to decipher the level of protection provided by envi-
ronmental standards in Block 15, and has created a significant
source of frustration and anxiety for many residents.
In effect, then, the EMP creates a framework for self regulation
by the company. In addition to the specific provisions discussed
above, two general provisions are particularly troubling because
they appear to give the company broad authority to set, and mod-
ify, environmental standards. The "Integral Program to Guaran-
tee Environmental Quality," which "regulates" 128 all of the pro-
grams and mechanisms in the EMP, includes a section entitled
"Environmental Norms." It provides:
OEPC [Occidental] will adopt the most applicable environmental
codes, norms, and regulations in all phases of the Project. The ap-
plication of those norms will be a dynamic process throughout the
development of the Project, in order to comply with the policy of
equivalence, which means that the same level of protection that is
required in the United States, should be given, unless the standards
in Ecuador are more strict.129
The required level of protection is not defined, and the provi-
sion implies, erroneously, that a single "level" of protection is re-
quired in the U.S.130 The Integral Program to Guarantee Environ-
128. Id. at 4.
129. Id. at 25. The provision reflects Occidental's corporate policy at the time it wrote
the EMP. Initially called "functional equivalence," and subsequently called "equivalent
intent," the policy was one of the first variations of "international standards" adopted by
an oil company in Amazonia. Although it sounds promising, "equivalent intent" suffers
from the same problems that characterize the more recent international standards policies
in the oil patch, discussed infra. It is vague, and levels of protection vary considerably at
different locations in the U.S. As a result, it allows the company to pick and choose among
myriad standards, without independent oversight.
The vagueness of the policy, and the virtually unlimited discretion that is granted to Oc-
cidental under the EMP, is illustrated by the fact that Occidental abandoned the policy of
functional equivalence-yet that change apparently did not require revisions to the EMP.
According to Clark Hull, Occidental's policy was changed in 1995 to "worldwide standard
of care," because some people in the oil industry, and internal auditors, interpreted
"equivalent intent" to require compliance with U.S. regulations. The new policy allows
variable standards around the world, where environments and exposure pathways vary.
According to Hull, this "lets the company apply good science and management tech-
niques" to the standard-setting process. Occidental has developed performance standards
for Block 15 under the policy. Hull Interview, supra note 32. Notwithstanding this, Occi-
dental refused to disclose the new standards to the author or local communities.
130. The lack of comprehensive national legal standards, consistent oil field practices, or
consensus about what constitutes "best practice" for exploration and production operations
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mental Quality also provides for annual review of the EMP, "in
order to determine the effectiveness of the application of its pro-
grams." Among other items, the review should include a "re-
evaluation" of the environmental impacts of the operations, and a
comparison of those impacts with impacts that were predicted in
the EIA. Based on the review, the EMP should be "reprogrammed
and adjusted." 131
Together, these provisions confirm that standards in Block 15
can be moving targets, and that environmental decision-making
and implementation is controlled by Occidental. Instead of pre-
scribing a body of clear standards to regulate the operations, justi-
fying the selection of those standards, and establishing a program
to implement, monitor and evaluate them, the EMP has been
crafted to legalize Occidental's internal corporate environmental
policy and management program, and authorize the company to
modify standards and practices without public disclosure, stake-
holder consultation, or government review and approval.
As a result, the use of the EMP as a legal standard in the Con-
tract not only contradicts the spirit of the UNCED agreements, but
also raises serious legal, policy and ethical questions. Presumably,
the company has made at least some of the decisions and deter-
minations called for in the EMP, yet the document was not up-
dated before being incorporated into the Contract. This omission
indicates that Occidental and Ecuador are unwilling to commit to
clear environmental standards and that, for the most part, the
state has ceded the authority to set environmental standards and
evaluate their effectiveness to the company. This amounts to the
privatization of environmental law. It is legally and ethically du-
bious because the State cannot constitutionally shirk its environ-
mental and social duties, bypass the national legislature, and le-
galize an environmental protection regime that allows private
special interests to set secret legal standards. In addition, Ecua-
dor's government does not have authority to extinguish or disre-
gard the rights of local residents-under both international law
and Ecuador's Constitution-to participate in decision-making
that can affect the environment, and to be fully informed and con-
sulted about plans and projects to exploit non-renewable re-
makes comparisons between U.S. and Block 15 standards and practices difficult; however,
some comparisons are offered in Kimerling 2001a, supra note 22.
131. EMP, supra note 58, at 34-35.
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sources in their territories. As a policy matter, it is unwise be-
cause it substitutes private law for public law without democratic
safeguards, and transfers control over compliance with state ob-
jectives to the special interests that need to be regulated to meet
those objectives. The potential for abuse is unlimited, and inequi-
ties in the distribution of political power in Ecuador are com-
pounded.
Although the public record is murky in many important re-
spects, some details that are disclosed in the EMP suggest that at
least some environmental standards have been set too low to be
reasonably expected to protect the environment. For example, the
EMP defines a standard for monitoring the impact of accidental
spills on flora and fauna. It provides that within six months of a
spill, "the biotic structure" of affected ecosystems should be
evaluated; in areas where the biotic mortality rate exceeds 50 per-
cent, additional studies should be conducted to determine
whether there are chronic impacts from the spill. This sounds au-
thoritative, but it is not a scientifically defensible approach to spill
response or natural resources monitoring, and appears to set a
standard that allows Occidental to disregard possible chronic im-
pacts on flora and fauna from oil and chemical spills, unless a
threshold 50 percent mortality rate can be documented within six
months. The shortcomings of the approach are compounded by
the failure of the EMP to specify action levels for cleanups. 132
These problems are further exacerbated by another detail in the
EMP. The general monitoring program establishes a single pa-
rameter to monitor the impact of Occidental's operations on flora
and fauna: the "lost [biological] diversity."133 This could be inter-
preted to permit any adverse impacts on flora and fauna that fall
short of extinction.134 The failure of those standards and the EMP
generally to ensure effective protection of natural resources, and
132. Id. at 18 and 21-22.
133. Id. at 22.
134. In addition, Occidental's ability to detect lost diversity is questionable. As with all
impact monitoring, baseline data is needed before operations begin. Moreover, by the time
"lost diversity" is detected by the company, it would likely represent irreparable harm and
dramatic changes in the environment, and possibly even mass extinctions. The EMP is un-
clear about how Occidental will apply the standard and detect "lost diversity;" the "deter-
mination" of baseline diversity, and selection of monitoring techniques and other possible
"ecological indicators" are left to the future. In practice, the biodiversity monitoring pro-
gram has not been implemented and currently there is no monitoring of flora and fauna,
even in Limoncocha Biological Reserve.
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the shortcomings of excessive reliance on environmental self regu-
lation, are illustrated by the Laguna Spill, discussed supra.135
2. International Standards
The excessive reliance on corporate self regulation in Block 15 is
also reflected and reinforced by provisions in the Contract that di-
rect Occidental to apply unspecified international environmental
standards and practices. Oil field standards and practices vary
considerably at different locations around the world, so the pre-
cise meaning of the obligations is unclear. 136 The terms are not de-
fined in the Contract; no specific norms or practices are identified;
135. See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
136. Although the precise wording varies somewhat, most provisions refer to standards
and practices that the international oil industry generally uses or accepts. For example, the
section on general obligations requires Occidental "to employ qualified personnel, as well
as equipment, machinery, materials and technology, in accordance with the best norms and
practices generally accepted by the international petroleum industry." Contract, supra note
31 1 5.1.8. The section on environmental protection includes a similarly promising but
vague requirement "[t]o use equipment, machinery, operational procedures and in general
technologies that comply with the standards for environmental protection and practices
used by the international petroleum industry, without prejudice to compliance with the
regulations existing in the country." Id. 91 5.1.20.11. This suggests that the key criteria for
selecting applicable standards is widespread-or even worldwide-use or acceptance by
international oil companies, and could be interpreted to mean that the meaning of "best
norms and practices" and "international standards" is what international oil companies,
like Occidental, currently do and say. This could help legalize and perpetuate the status
quo, and eliminate only the most obsolete and indefensible oil field practices.
By using language that suggests that general use or acceptance is the applicable criteria,
rather than "best practice" or "highest standards," the provisions in the Contract could also
be interpreted to require nothing more than the "lowest common denominator" among the
myriad standards and practices required by various regulatory authorities around the
world, including developing countries. This interpretation would exclude standards and
practices that are commonly implemented in industrial countries because of regulatory re-
quirements, unless they are also widely used in developing countries. Such an interpreta-
tion would contradict the popular and official view in Ecuador that international standards
are meant to improve environmental practices beyond what is required by Ecuadorian law.
The language in the Contract, then, is too vague to constrain Occidental's discretion
when it selects and interprets applicable international standards. Moreover, it suggests
that the international standards that are legally binding contractual obligations are not the
same as the "international standards" that the company promises in its public relations.
Occidental has pledged to implement a "new model" of responsible hydrocarbon opera-
tions to protect the fragile rainforest environment, and has associated this promise with its
stature, and standards, as an international company. In its Contract, however, the com-
pany has not agreed to develop new and innovative practices, or even to necessarily use
the best practices and most protective standards that are currently available, unless oil
companies around the world also commonly use them. For a fuller discussion, see generally
Kimerling 2001a, supra note 22.
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no sources or standard-setting authorities are identified; and there
are no requirements for public disclosure, stakeholder consulta-
tion, or government review and approval of selected standards.
In addition, the references to international standards and practices
do not discriminate between practices in industrial countries and
practices in developing countries, or distinguish legal, or govern-
mental, standards and norms from industry guidelines. 137
Standing alone, the provisions suggest that a determinate and
credible body of comprehensive international standards and prac-
tices exists. This is potentially misleading because there is no in-
ternational consensus on what "international standards" or "best
practice" really mean in environmental and social matters, and
there is no public international institution with legal authority to
regulate exploration and production activities.138 In practice,
137. The provisions could be interpreted as adopting voluntary standards and guide-
lines that have been published by oil industry trade groups such as the American Petro-
leum Institute (API) and the Oil Industry International Exploration and Production Forum
(E&P Forum). However, that interpretation would still fail to answer the question of pre-
cisely what standards apply to the operations. Although industry guidelines commonly
include some provisions that, if implemented, could lead to some significant improvements
in oil field operations, most industry "standards" for environmental protection are too
vague and aspirational to serve as meaningful legal standards. For example, they routinely
recognize the need to "minimize pollution," but leave companies considerable leeway in
how to interpret and apply that policy. In addition, they frequently offer companies a
menu of alternative practices, rather than specifying a precise standard or practice as the
most'effective environmental measure. When specific practices are flagged as particularly
harmful to the environment-such as road building in tropical forests--companies are ad-
vised to try to "avoid" those practices, when practicable, but they are clearly permitted and
contemplated, at the company's discretion.
The soft and generalized nature of environmental guidelines for the oil industry differs
considerably from the precision and clarity that commonly characterize technical API
Standards for equipment, materials, and installation and engineering practices, developed
by the industry to reduce customization, support the reliable use of interchangeable
equipment and materials, and facilitate communication between users and suppliers. See,
e.g, AMERICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: WASTE
MANAGEMENT IN EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION OPERATIONS, API E5 (1997); E & P
FORUM, OIL INDUSTRY OPERATING GUIDELINES FOR TROPICAL RAINFORESTS, Report No.
2.49/170 (1991). C.f. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, 2000 PUBLICATIONS, PROGRAMS AND
SERVICES CATALOG (2000). For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling 2001a, supra note 22.
138. The E&P Forum and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Industry
and Environment Center have also formulated nonbinding guidelines for oil field opera-
tions; however, they reflect deficiencies similar to the industry guidelines. The terms "best
practice," "good practice" and "responsible standards" are used repeatedly and apparently
interchangeably, but their meaning is vague. When specific standards and practices are
catalogued, they do not necessarily follow or even identify the most environmentally pro-
tective standards and practices that apply in industrial nations. For example, since 1979,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has generally prohibited the discharge of explo-
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standards and practices can vary considerably in different loca-
tions, even in industrial nations where regulatory regimes are
relatively well-established. In the U.S., most oil field regulation
varies from state to state, and standards can also differ at different
locations in a state. In the absence of meaningful procedures for
government review and approval of selected norms and practices,
the provisions in the Contract-like the EMP--could operate as a
legalized, albeit nonexplicit, form of self regulation, allowing Oc-
cidental to pick and choose among myriad standards required by
regulatory authorities around the world. In effect, this arbitrarily
entrusts the state's authority to set certain standards to the very
company whose conduct needs to be regulated.
In addition, Occidental and other TNCs in Ecuador have ag-
gressively promoted industry standards and guidelines under the
general rubric of "international standards" and "best practice."
As a result, private industry positions are commonly confused
with public legal norms, and some industry standards are acquir-
ing a cloak of public legal authority and legitimacy that offers mis-
ration and production wastes into fresh waters; however, this standard is not adopted as a
guideline for "best practice," or even included among the litany of standards listed in a
chart in the document. The guidelines clearly contemplate waste discharges into fresh wa-
ters, as well as other practices that are disfavored in the U.S.-and have been either re-
stricted or prohibited in various states-such as annular injection. Annular injection is the
injection of wastes into the annulus of a well, without isolating contaminants from under-
ground aquifers.
Although the E&P-UNEP guidelines affirm a number of important principles, such as
the need for detailed planning, corporate commitment of financial and human resources,
compliance monitoring, and environmental regulation by governments, they leave basic
standards unclear, and suggest merely an aspirational approach to environmental protec-
tion. Good goals are essential and continual improvement could help raise environmental
standards; however, in the absence of clear norms that define minimum standards for pro-
tection, these noble goals by themselves could justify low levels of protection. In addition,
the guidelines refer to E&P industry guidelines without review or analysis of their content.
This practice misleadingly puts the United Nations imprimatur on what are really private
norms defined by special interests, and thereby contributes to confusion between private
and public norms. E & P FORuM-UNEP, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN OIL AND GAS
EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF ISSUES AND MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
(1997).
The World Bank has also published non-binding internal guidelines for pollution pre-
vention. Significantly, the guidelines do not purport to embody "best practice" or the
"highest" environmental standards that can be found in the oil patch; instead, they "repre-
sent good environmental management practices which can be achieved and maintained
with the levels of skills and resources typically available in countries" where the Bank fi-
nances projects. The World Bank Group, Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook, 1998:
Toward Cleaner Production (1998) at v-vi. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling 2001a, supra
note 22.
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leading assurances about environmental protection to Ecuadori-
ans who typically do not understand where those standards come
from or how they are developed. Many people, for example, be-
lieve that the American Petroleum Institute (API) is a U.S. gov-
ernment agency. The confusion about the sources of international
standards is compounded by ignorance about their content. Many
people in Ecuador believe that a credible but enigmatic body of
substantive international norms exists that can effectively protect
the environment. Occidental and other international oil compa-
nies often seem to cultivate this myth and exploit the ignorance
about international standards, in order to reassure government of-
ficials, communities and other stakeholders about the quality and
control of their operations.
For example, both corporate and government officials cite ISO
14001 as the most important international environmental standard
governing operations in Block 15. ISO 14001 is a private voluntary
international standard for environmental management systems. It
is designed to help corporations define and maintain environ-
mental policies. However, it is not a performance standard and
does not impose any substantive requirements; instead, it requires
a series of procedures that form a management system. 139
Firms can use ISO 14001 as a standard for internal auditing, self-
declaration, or third-party certification. In 1998, Occidental be-
came.the first company in Ecuador to obtain certification under
ISO 14001. To be certified, a company must: (1) establish an envi-
ronmental policy that includes a commitment to comply with ap-
plicable laws and a commitment to work towards continual im-
provement and pollution prevention; and (2) develop an internal
process to manage and review that policy. Each company, how-
ever, is expected to set its own objectives and targets. Two or
more firms carrying out similar activities but with significantly
different environmental performance may simultaneously comply
with the standard. A policy to meet applicable national stan-
dards--even in developing countries like Ecuador-would satisfy
139. International Organization for Standardization, ISO 14001: Environmental Manage-
ment Systems-Specifications with Guidance for Use (1996) [hereinafter ISO 14001]. ISO 14001
was adopted by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), a nongovern-
mental organization that promotes international standardization for technologies, in order
to "help rationalize the international trading process." International Organization for
Standardization, Introduction to ISO, at http://www.iso.ch/infoe/intro.htm (last modified
Jan. 8, 1999). Members of ISO include private and public standards bodies.
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the ISO standard. In addition, transparency is not required, al-
though some procedure for external and internal communication
must exist.
External certification is conducted by private companies that are
contracted by the company seeking certification. It certifies man-
agement systems, and not outcomes or performance. For exam-
ple, a certifier would examine whether a company has a process to
identify applicable legal requirements, but not whether it has
complied with those requirements. 140 In Occidental's case, there is
no systematic government oversight to review the company's
compliance with Ecuadorian law. Despite this, some problems
have arisen that demonstrate that at least some corners have been
cut and operations are not in full compliance with the law. These
deficiencies illustrate both the inadequacies of self regulation and
the failure of ISO 14001 to disclose and correct violations-even
when they have serious consequences for workers and local resi-
dents.
For example, in 1997 a worker was killed on a barge operated
for Occidental by a subcontractor to provide transportation across
the Napo River. The barge got caught in a cable that crossed the
river; when the worker, Dumas Tello, tried to free the barge from
the cable, it snapped and threw him into the river. His body was
never found.141
Subsequently, the Captain of the Port of Francisco de Orellana
(Coca) determined that a number of laws had been violated: the
captain of the barge was not licensed to operate that type of ves-
sel; the motor was damaged and did not operate in reverse; no life
preservers were available on the barge; and Tello was not other-
wise wearing proper attire. In addition to violations on the vessel,
the cable that caused the accident had been placed across the river
illegally, by another subcontractor for Occidental. That subcon-
tractor, Seiscom Delta United, was carrying out seismic studies,
140. See ISO 14001, supra note 139. In operations like Occidental's, where certifiers are
contracted from abroad and work in a number of different countries and industries, the
certifier may not be familiar with applicable national laws or have substantial technical ex-
pertise about the operations that are managed under the policy. Moreover, even when cer-
tifiers know that an operation is not in full compliance with applicable standards, certifica-
tion will generally not be denied if the certifier believes that the company is making efforts
to achieve compliance.
141. Armada of Ecuador, Captain of the Port of Francisco de Orellana (Coca), Oficio No.
CAPORE-AYD-030-0 (Feb. 4,1997).
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and did not have a permit from marine authorities to suspend ca-
bles across the river and obstruct navigation. 142
When asked about the incident, Occidental officials in Quito be-
came annoyed, and insisted that the company had permission for
the seismic line. 43 Although it is true that Occidental had permis-
sion from Ecuador's Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) to con-
duct the seismic studies, it did not have permission to obstruct
navigation on the river. After the accident, Seiscom Delta applied
for that permission in order to continue the studies. This cavalier
attitude towards the law illustrates a general attitude commonly
found in the oil patch: once a company has an agreement with
Petroecuador and MEM to conduct certain operations, it can es-
sentially do as it pleases in remote Amazon oil fields. A culture of
impunity-the belief that oil companies and subcontractors can
break the law and suffer no adverse consequences-perpetuates
itself.144 In the interview, Occidental officials denied any illegali-
ties until asked about the report by the Captain of the Port, and
the subsequent request for a permit. They insisted that the acci-
dent was an isolated incident; however, the blatant disregard of
fundamental safety requirements by both of the subcontractors
that were involved suggests more systemic shortcomings. 145
Another Ecuadorian law that has been violated by Occidental
prohibits dumping materials into waters in ways that threaten
142. Id. The incident was apparently "hushed up." According to Tello's brother, repre-
sentatives from Occidental told his family that there was no proof that Tello had died, be-
cause they did not have a corpse. Tello's brother, however, traveled to the region to search
for the body and find out what had happened. He appealed to the Captain of the Port to
investigate the death. None of the government officials who were interviewed for the case
study knew about the incident. The author learned about it because she knew the victim.
143. Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 38..
144. In addition to disregarding safety laws and cutting comers in the operations, the
barge subcontractor also violated Ecuador's labor laws by failing to pay social security
taxes for Tello to the government. See generally Servicios Petroleros Galeth, Liquidation of
Salary, Dumas Tello (Oct. 20-31, 1996); Servicios Petroleros Galeth, Liquidation of Salary,
Dumas Tello (Nov. 1-30, 1996); Servicios Petroleros Galeth, Liquidation of Salary, Dumas
Tello (Dec. 1-31, 1996).
145. Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 38. In addition to legal violations, the in-
cident and response raise questions about Occidental's implementation of corporate poli-
cies. One of the ten "guiding Health, Environment and Safety (HES) principles" is to "util-
ize sound maintenance and work practices, safety-conscious design, employee training and
incident investigations and corrective measures to prevent health, environment and safety
incidents. Should an accident occur, we will be prepared to respond promptly, appropri-
ately and professionally." A "feature" of the HES policy is to "select contractors consider-
ing their HES performance." HESMS GUIDANCE MANUAL, supra note 45, at 6, 13.
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navigation by aquatic life.146 Since 1996, a road built by the com-
pany to drill the exploratory well in El Eden has blocked the mi-
gration of fish from a lake into seasonally flooded forest. In addi-
tion to environmental impacts, this has effectively destroyed a
local fishery. In response to complaints, Occidental paid a fine to
El Eden, but has not repaired the damage. 147 It is unclear, then,
how these and other possible violations of Ecuadorian law affect
Occidental's ISO 14001 certification, or even whether the certifier
knew about them. Occidental refuses to disclose the certifier's re-
ports, or any other documents that were generated as part of the
ISO process.
For the most part, then, ISO 14001 is a qualitative and subjective
standard that allows companies considerable discretion in how to
interpret and implement it. The greatest value of the standard
seems to be internal-it helps firms internalize an environmental
culture. 148 In theory, if a company takes ISO 14001 seriously, em-
ployees will not only comply with environmental requirements,
but also spend more time finding and correcting environmental
problems. As a result, environmental performance should im-
prove. However, ISO 14001 certification does not guarantee this
result or disclose whether it occurs, and does not answer the basic
question of what substantive environmental standards apply to
the operations. What Occidental's ISO 14001 certification does
clearly show is that the company's environmental paperwork is in
order.
Notwithstanding this, environmental officials and other stake-
holders in Ecuador believe that Occidental's ISO 14001 certifica-
tion means that the operations in Block 15 meet some substantive
international environmental standards, and that the company's
compliance has been independently verified. Although no Ecua-
dorians interviewed for this study knew precisely what the stan-
dard requires, they all believed that Occidental's certification con-
firms that the company has successfully raised environmental
standards beyond what is required by Ecuador's national law, and
146. Law of Fishing and Fishing Development, arts. 47(e) & 80, R.O. No. 497 (Feb. 19,
1974), renumbered in R.O. No. 252 (Aug. 19, 1985).
147. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling 2001b, supra note 22.
148. Without doubt, the internalization of an environmental culture is an essential com-
ponent of corporate responsibility and a needed change in the oil industry. However, reli-
ance on corporate culture to undertake self regulation is not sufficient, alone, to guarantee
environmental protection.
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that a credible-but unfamiliar-international authority has au-
dited Occidental's environmental performance.
For example, MEM's Deputy Secretary for Environmental Pro-
tection, whose office is formally charged with environmental
oversight in Block 15 and other areas where oil development and
mining are underway, described ISO 14001 as "ideal for the com-
panies and the State." 149 He explained that, given the proliferation
of oil and mining operations across huge geographical areas, and
the agency's limited environmental staff, ISO 14001 "gives us cer-
tainty that the company operates well."'150
The confidence and confusion surrounding the ISO certification
are not entirely surprising because Occidental has aggressively
promoted certification in Ecuador like a Good Housekeeping Seal
of Approval. In addition to distributing the Oxy: ISO 14001 Certi-
fied brochure, the company has placed a large sign on the road to
CPF announcing the certification. One prominent environmental
official even added "ISO 14001 Certified" to the Occidental logo
on his business card. In presentations, interviews and conversa-
tions, corporate officials regularly cite ISO 14001 as objective evi-
dence of the company's environmental excellence. 151 Similarly,
149. Interview with Fausto Coral, Deputy Secretary for Environmental Protection, Min-
istry of Energy and Mines, in Quito (Aug. 17, 1999).
150. Id. The Deputy Secretary is the highest level environmental official with jurisdic-
tion--and responsibilities-in the oil fields. His attitude welcoming international stan-
dards and oversight is also noteworthy because it raises questions about the position that
developing nations commonly express in international negotiations. Representatives of
those governments have vigorously opposed international environmental regulation of de-
velopment activities in favor of developing environmental law at the national level. Ex-
perience in Ecuador, however, suggests that at least some of the officials who bear direct
and real-world responsibility for environmental regulation in developing countries would
welcome international initiatives that measure environmental performance at specific loca-
tions, against international standards.
Similarly, the official in the Ministry of the Environment Department of Protected Areas
who oversees management of Limoncocha Biological Reserve explained that the agency
does not monitor the impact of Occidental's operations on the reserve or sample water
quality in Lake Limoncocha. He assumed, however, that Occidental's ISO 14001 certifica-
tion means that the company monitors water quality and other possible impacts on the re-
serve, according to parameters that meet international standards, and that Occidental's per-
formance there meets international standards. Telephone interview with Angel Onofa,
Ministry of the Environment, Dept. of Protected Areas (May 3, 2000).
151. For example, during the author's tour of CPF with three representatives of local
communities, the company's formal presentation about environmental protection began by
citing the certification. The ISO standard was described as a body of international norms,
with which 99 countries are affiliated, that has certified that Occidental's "Environmental
Management Plan [EMP] complies with international standards." When asked, "What are
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they used the mystique of "international standards" to dismiss
questions about possible contamination by naturally occurring ra-
dioactive material (NORM). Corporate officials admitted that
NORM is present in Block 15, but said that no special environ-
mental measures are required because it is found at levels that are
below "international standards." When asked, however, they
could not identify the source or substance of those standards.
This is not surprising because none exist. 5 2
The international standards provisions in the Contract, then, are
not only too vague to ensure the export of higher environmental
standards by Occidental but also-together with the general dis-
course about international standards in Ecuador-may operate to
undermine the development of national environmental law. They
offer government officials and other stakeholders a sense of secu-
rity that standards and practices are improving, based on enig-
matic norms that lie beyond the reach-or responsibility-of na-
tional authorities, with regard to both standard-setting and
oversight mechanisms. In addition, they contribute to the arbi-
trary legitimization of norms that have been defined by special in-
the standards?" the acting chief of field operations responded, "there are many." When
asked to specify some of the standards, he said he did not remember them all, and identi-
fied none. When asked to clarify the statement about affiliated countries, officials said they
did not know whether the term refers to governments or nongovernmental institutions,
like private companies. CPF Visit, supra note 34. This reflects and reinforces the confusion
in Ecuador between public and private norms.
In an interview in Quito, Occidental's Chief of Field Operations and Acting General
Manager, Vicki Hollub, admitted that ISO 14001 does not verify compliance with legal re-
quirements. However, she argued that corporate culture is more likely than government
regulation to protect the environment and its inhabitants:
You know I could get away with violating the law in the United States if I wanted; I
have worked there for ten years and there are no government inspections. We just fill
out forms, so the corporate culture is more important.
Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 38.
While it is true that, as a practical matter, corporate culture is more important than legal
requirements in determining levels of environmental protection when government agen-
cies do not effectively implement and enforce environmental laws, that does not mean that
environmental regulation can be summarily dismissed as unimportant. Business surveys
of TNCs have identified regulation as "the predominant factor" encouraging the adoption
and implementation of environmental management within firms. Ans Kolk, ECONOMICS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 9-12, 27 (2000).
152. CPF Visit, supra note 34; Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 38. Similarly, in
the U.S., no national regulations define action levels or otherwise specifically address
NORM-contaminated wastes and materials. Some states have adopted regulations for
management and disposal of NORM-contaminated materials; other states have been study-
ing the issue. Kimerling 2001a, supra note 22 at n 268 and accompanying text.
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terests.
As a general matter, the resources and international experience
of TNCs like Occidental give them a clear advantage when it
comes to comprehending environmental technology and interna-
tional standards and, thus, to managing the discourse about them
in Ecuador. Occidental and other TNCs use this imbalance effec-
tively, illustrating the truth of the maxim, "information is power."
The invocation of international standards has become a tool that
companies use to maintain their dominance over environmental
decision-making and implementation; wrap themselves in a ve-
neer of corporate responsibility; reassure government officials and
residents; cultivate confusion about applicable standards and
practices; deflect meaningful oversight and transparency; rebuff
local grievances and the participatory aspirations of affected resi-
dents; and arbitrarily legitimize industry norms. This dynamic
helps explain why Occidental has refused to publicly disclose the
precise standards that govern its operations, and why government
officials are not fully informed about the company's standards
and practices. Occidental's control of environmental information
reflects and reinforces its control of environmental decision-
making and implementation in Block 15, and violates the spirit of
the UNCED agreements and the rights of indigenous residents in
the development process.5 3
IV. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Experience in Block 15 shows that it is easy for TNCs to say the
right things, while acting otherwise. Occidental has systemati-
cally violated its own published policies; in concert with Ecuador,
it has disregarded the emerging rights of the Quichua to partici-
pate in development and environmental protection in their terri-
tory. In one significant change, the company has begun to share
some of the economic benefits of oil development with affected
communities. However, for the most part, those benefits have not
been sustained. Sustainable community development is a formi-
dable challenge, but in the case of Block 15, Occidental appears to
have appropriated the language of sustainable development to
153. It is also dubious under Ecuadorian law. For a fuller discussion, see generally Ki-
merling 2001a, supra note 22. For a discussion of environmental information and commu-
nity relations, see generally Kimerling 2001b, supra note 22.
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help perpetuate an environmentally risky and unsustainable
model of development. There is little evidence of a sustained ef-
fort to work with communities to achieve sustainable develop-
ment. Rather than inform and consult residents in a meaningful
way, Occidental has bullied and seduced them, using misinforma-
tion, pressure, and economic power to "buy consciences" and en-
ter Quichua communities without opposition. Many people now
say they were tricked into giving Occidental "permission" to work
in their communities. Outside the oil patch, Occidental used its
local welcome to deflect criticism from environmentalists and beef
up its public image.
The arrival of "development" in remote areas, with promises of"all the best things forever," invited indigenous populations to
move away from traditional subsistence towards a new cash and
wage-based economy. Occidental's operations, however, have
failed to meet expectations in providing jobs and services. At the
same time, they have impaired subsistence production. Explora-
tion and production activities have threatened or harmed renew-
able natural resources in a number of locations, diminishing peo-
ple's ability to continue a sustainable and self-reliant way of life,
and reducing their resource base for sustainable development.
The distribution of environmental impacts and compensatory
benefits from development is not equitable. Most people who live
in communities where production operations are underway do
not feel that they benefit from oil development; increasingly, peo-
ple say it harms their quality of life more than it helps them.
Residents are not well-informed about operations that affect
them, and do not participate in environmental decision-making or
monitoring. Occidental's firm control over environmental and
development information helps it rebuff the participatory aspira-
tions and grievances'54 of its neighbors, and maintain control over
154. The absence of mechanisms to resolve complaints and disputes is a serious prob-
lem for many indigenous residents in Block 15. One common complaint is that Occidental
"offers" but does not keep all of its promises, and communities have to "insist" that it
comply with agreements, even regarding small items. This creates frustration; with time, it
discourages people from challenging the company. Residents are busy with small mat-
ters-insignificant to Occidental but important to them-and, thus, are less likely to look at
the big picture. They learn that the company alone has the power to decide whether and
when to comply. Eventually, people become worn down and challenges seem futile. With
time, the dynamic contributes to general feelings of resignation and confusion and helps
keep the company firmly in control. It also allows Occidental to drag out the distribution
of promised "benefits," recycle promises, and appease residents relatively cheaply, when
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environmental decision-making and implementation. The com-
pany seems to cultivate an atmosphere of confusion. Corporate
officials say Occidental is committed to transparency. Despite
this, the company's philosophy in Ecuador seems more aptly de-
scribed by a statement to residents in Pompeya, after they noticed
a tank truck at night, going to and from a "dry" well in the
comuna. A group of residents investigated, and noticed oil around
the wellhead. They confronted Occidental because they thought it
had lied when it told them the well was dry; if the well was pro-
ducing, they wanted an agreement to rent the land and share in
the benefits of production. 55 In response, an official said the
company was "reinjecting" into the well. When asked why Occi-
dental was working at night, he said, "because we work better at
night."
needed.
Similar practices are used to deflect environmental grievances. Except for a favored few,
when residents complain to Occidental or raise questions, they are typically ignored, belit-
tled, or challenged. Too often, their letters are not answered, or they wait outside locked
gates for hours. This discourages people from pursuing complaints and inquiries. As one
man explained: "We have almost no rights because they have machinery, and say we must
have proof to complain. But we do not have an apparatus." At the same time, Occidental
assures people that there is no cause for concern because it uses cutting edge technology
and international standards-even discharges and sometimes spills (of produced water)
are allegedly clean enough to drink-but refuses to disclose information to verify those
statements.
Another common response to complaints and requests for information is that Occidental
is "just a contractor" and simply does as it is told by the government or Petroecuador. This
is at odds with the image the company projects elsewhere-of an industry leader with a
new model of responsible operations-and belies the considerable power that it has as the
operator of Block 15. For the most part, then, people have no voice in oil development ac-
tivities in their communities because the decision-makers not only exclude them, but also
are invisible and inaccessible when questions and problems arise, and there are no impar-
tial fora available to affected residents to resolve disputes with companies or administer
justice. Ecuador's courts are generally regarded as politicized, inefficient and corrupt; ad-
ministrative agencies are either weak vis a vis oil companies or favor industry interests
over indigenous peoples and the environment. The right to a fair and impartial legal rem-
edy is not only a fundamental human right, but also an essential element of environmental
protection and sustainable development. Although the obligation to establish fora for the
impartial resolution of disputes lies with the State, Occidental seems to take advantage of
the institutional vacuum. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling 2001b, supra note 22.
155. At the time, residents did not know about the expropriations. In the U.S., state
laws and lease agreements require companies to seal abandoned wells to prevent contami-
nants from migrating to the surface or into groundwater. Occidental apparently has not
sealed the "dry" well in Pompeya. To convert a dry well into an injection well in the U.S., a
special permit is needed; in some locations, landowner permission is also required. Injec-
tion of legally hazardous wastes at a site that is not permitted to receive them is a federal
crime. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling 2001a, supra note 22 at 382-88.
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In El Eden, where Occidental is building new production facili-
ties, elements of the same basic pattern appear to be repeating
themselves. The economic price that Occidental is paying to enter
El Eden in a "friendly" way has increased considerably since the
company "greeted" Rio Jivino; in another advance, an agreement
with the community provides that payments will continue
throughout the 19-year life of the project.15 6 However, Occidental
has aggressively fought efforts by residents of El Eden to protect
their land rights and realize their rights to information and par-
ticipation in environmental decision-making and monitoring. 157
156. Production facilities will also expand throughout the term of the agreement, and
include: eight new drilling platforms at undisclosed locations; expansion of two existing
platforms; an unspecified number of vertical, horizontal and directional wells; a 30-hectare
production center; "respective" roads and pipelines; a 10-hectare landfill; a port; and seis-
mic studies. Agreement between the Community El Eden and OEPC [Occidental] for Petro-
leum Exploration and Exploitation in Territory of the Community (Jan. 15, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter El Eden-Occidental Agreement].
Occidental is also building a new 132.2-kilometer pipeline to transport oil from El Eden
to Lago Agrio, where a new trans-Ecuadorian pipeline, known as OCP, is under construc-
tion to transport crude oil from the Amazon region to Ecuador's Pacific coast. Occidental
Exploration and Production Company, "Informative Notebook, Eden-Lago Agrio Pipeline"
4 (Sept. 5, 2000). The OCP project is discussed briefly infra at note 167.
157. For a detailed account, see Kimerling 2001b, supra note 22. Occidental repeatedly
rebuffed residents' requests for information--and efforts to negotiate an agreement to pro-
tect their rights-by claiming that events were preliminary and the future undecided, while
at the same time, it systematically advanced development activities, according to plans ne-
gotiated with Ecuador's government. Periodically, it diffused disappointment, deflected
demands, and sought to seduce groups and individuals in the "beads and trinkets" tradi-
tion. This continued even after exploratory drilling confirmed the presence of commercial
reserves in community lands in 1996; in addition, Occidental misinformed the comuna. It
told El Eden that the exploratory well was dry, but told Oil and Gas Journal that the find
was so significant that it "could by itself justify construction of a pipeline" to the remote
location. Kimerling 2001b, supra note 22 (quoting Williams 1997, supra note 24 at 45).
In 1997, the company offered to "buy" 17.3 hectares of community lands. Residents did
not oppose oil development, but refused to sell the land because it would betray their cul-
ture and violate community norms; in the words of one man, "it would be like cutting off
an arm of our mother, to sell." They offered to rent the land, but the company insisted on
buying it. In a series of meetings, residents beseeched Occidental to negotiate a rental
agreement, and resolved not to cash the company's check for the land. The meetings
ended, but anxiety in the comuna did not. People thought Occidental was "occupying"
their land without permission, because it had not fully evacuated and restored the drill site
as promised.
In 1998, the comuna wrote to corporate officials in Quito and, subsequently, to the presi-
dent of Occidental in the U.S., requesting a meeting to resolve the dispute. Neither letter
was answered and, in response to inquiries, a U.S. official provided the author with mis-
leading information. He said that the letter was "puzzling and bizarre" because Occidental
does not buy land or work in indigenous lands without permission; and El Eden is on the
"fringe" of Block 15 and Petroecuador, not Occidental, works there. Meriage Interview 1,
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Under the agreement, Occidental will solicit (and secure) the
expropriation of 200 hectares of community lands, and make an-
nual payments to the comuna. Most of the monies will be depos-
ited in an "untouchable fund," from which only the interest, and
not the principal, may be spent; by 2019, payments to the fund
will total $392,994.158 While there is no question that people in El
supra note 74; Meriage Interview 2, supra note 74.
Nearly a year later, the comuna threatened to tear down an antenna on the occupied
land, if the company did not send someone to resolve the dispute. In 1999, a meeting took
place, but residents said the company "made them dizzy" with talk about laws. They still
did not understand why Occidental refused to negotiate a rental agreement, and decided to
hold another assembly and invite outsiders to help them understand what the company
said. At that meeting, Occidental said that the government had expropriated the land more
than a year prior; that the company was not involved in the decision to expropriate; and
that the law requires expropriation, so Occidental cannot legally negotiate a rental agree-
ment. At the same time, it denied that it had plans to work at the site. Prior to the meeting,
however, the new Contract was signed and reported in the press. The author and another
guest informed the assembly about the press reports, which had mentioned plans to de-
velop the El Eden reserves; but at the meeting, Occidental refused to confirm or deny that
the Contract had been signed.
Occidental's claim that expropriation is required by Ecuador's law-at the same time it
violates other laws with impunity-prompted some residents to question whether the law
is simply another means for the company and government to dominate them: it operated as
a mysterious process that discredited and overran community norms and values, and shut
people out of decisions that affect them. It failed to protect their rights, but was used to
take away their land and shield the company from responsibility for the practice. Ecua-
dor's Law of Hydrocarbons authorizes expropriation for oil development, but does not ap-
pear to require it. Discussions leading to the El Eden-Occidental Agreement discussed in
the text began in the fall of 2000.
158. The total includes $72,994 as compensation for expropriation of the 200 hectacres.
El Eden-Occidental Agreement, supra note 156, at cl. 3.2. In addition, El Eden will receive
$6,000 per year for the first five years, as the capital and interest income in the Intangible
Fund grow. Id. Further assistance includes: "safe water" and electricity for each family in
the comuna; construction of a community center and mechanical workshop; expansion and
improvement of a community trail; $80,000 to improve primary education and establish a
high school in the comuna; five scholarships per year for high school or university students,
until the new high school opens; two outboard motors every five years for student trans-
portation; a study of ways to fund teachers' salaries; a $50,000 "intangible fund" for health
care; reimbursement of up to $20,000 for emergency medical treatment in hospitals; con-
struction of a heath center; a one-time donation of medicines; financial support for a"community doctor;" payments of $5,000 per year to the development NGO, FEPP, for pro-
jects and training for women; two courses per year with engineers to improve agricultural
production and products that promote sustainable development; and preference to the
comuna for contracts for local labor, including maintenance of roads and platforms. Id. at
cls. 3.3-4.
Estimated reserves in the area under development are 100-200 million barrels of oil,
roughly half of Block 15's total reserves. Williams 1997, supra note 24, at 45. At January
2001 prices ($20 per barrel), their value is $2-4 billion. Production is expected to be 45,000
barrels per day, with a market value of $900,000 per day at that price. See U.S. Dep't of En-
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Eden want money to buy goods that they cannot produce, and see
oil development as an opportunity-perhaps their only opportu-
nity-for improved health care, education, transportation, jobs
and income, this is not the same thing as sustainable develop-
ment. The arrangement could jeopardize the natural resource
base of the comuna, and threaten the ability of future generations,
as well as neighboring communities, to meet their subsistence and
development needs. It could also be used to undermine the right
of people in El Eden and throughout affected watersheds to a
healthy environment. In the event of environmental injury, Occi-
dental has agreed to either repair the damage or pay indemnifica-
tion.159 The agreement also reflects and reinforces the privatiza-
tion of environmental law in Block 15, by affirming that
environmental protection for the operations is regulated by the
company's EIA and EMP.160 Residents, however, did not partici-
pate in the EIA process or review the EIA or EMP before signing
the agreement.
Problems in the oil fields are not limited to Block 15. In
Huaorani territory, frustration recently erupted in anger and vio-
lence. An oil worker was speared and wounded by a Huaorani
man, after his nine-month-old son died. A Columbian company
ergy, Energy Information Administration (EIA), Ecuador Country Analysis Brief, available
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ecuador.html. Thus, although the economic value
of the assistance to El Eden likely surpasses that of any other oil company-community
agreement in the region, its cost to Occidental is small when compared to the value of the
oil, total costs of development, and anticipated profits.
159. Even this commitment may prove illusory because it is limited to damages that are
(1) caused by failure to comply with Occidental's EMP and Ecuadorian regulations; and (2)
are "duly demonstrated, confirmed, and sanctioned by the competent environmental au-
thorities." El Eden-Occidental Agreement, supra note 156 at cl. 9. There is no provision for
damages caused by accidents or intentional actions that lie outside the prescriptions of the
EMP and regulations. Moreover, to date, there has been no meaningful oversight of Occi-
dental's operations by the government, and environmental authorities in the Ministry of
Energy and Mines may recommend sanctions, but do not have legal authority to levy them.
The management plan is not identified but, presumably, Occidental is required to pre-
pare an EIA for the new facilities, that includes an EMP. Residents, however, have not seen
the EIA (or EMP). In addition, as discussed supra, the new Contract-which was negoti-
ated in anticipation of the new production facilities-adopts the 1992 EMP as a legal stan-
dard, and Occidental has described that EMP as the document that "collates" all applicable
standards and practices. Hull Interview, supra note 32.
Efforts by Occidental to use the agreement with El Eden to limit environmental obliga-
tions would be legally dubious, but residents have limited understanding of the law and
could be deterred by the provision from asserting their rights.
160. Id. at cl. 8.
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working in the area, Petrocol, was blamed for the death, because it
had medical facilities and transportation, but failed to help save
the infant's life. In a communication to the press, the Huaorani
organization, ONHAE, explained the incident as a reflection of
"the extreme conditions in which our people live because of the
petroleum companies in the territory, [prompting] the return to
old Huaorani traditions for defense and vengeance." 161 Five oil
"blocks" cover 80% of Huaorani territory, and there is no "seri-
ous" prior consultation with the Huaorani or credible environ-
mental and social controls or monitoring.162 The communication
explained:
Companies only help the communities that are located near their fa-
cilities, with minimal benefits, and in most cases, the help is insig-
nificant. The community relations officers from the companies de-
liver gifts such as rice, sugar, money, motors and infrastructure, in
order to convince and manipulate the communities about petroleum
activities and control any conflict. Many times they promise things
that then are not fulfilled and they divide communities from the
[Huaoranil organization.
161. Roughly 2000 Huaorani live in 25 communities. Organization of the Huaorani Na-
tionality of the Ecuadorian Amazon, Press Communication (Oct. 10, 2000) [hereinafter
Huaorani Communication].
At the time, only one company, Repsol-YPF, had a written agreement with the
Huaorani. Id. Prepared by Maxus after another TNC, Conoco, withdrew from the Block 16
area amidst a storm of controversy, the 20-year "friendship agreement" was part of a high
profile voluntary initiative to reform (and "green") oil development. The project was the
first to produce oil in Yasuni National Park and Huaorani territory. Soon after the agree-
ment was signed in 1993, one Huaorani woman described it (to the author) as an agree-
ment between the president of ONHAE and the company "for t-shirts," apparently because
most Huaorani had limited information about the agreement and because Maxus distrib-
uted t-shirts announcing the new "friendship" at a high-profile signing ceremony that was
attended by a large number of Huaorani, important Ecuadorian and U.S. government offi-
cials, and the press. For an account of events leading to the "friendship," including unsuc-
cessful efforts by ONHAE to stop the operations from going forward and divisions among
environmental NGOs about whether to oppose the project, see Joe Kane, SAVAGES (1995).
Maxus was subsequently acquired by YPF, and YPF by Repsol.
Under the agreement, ONHAE receives annual payments in several program areas, in-
cluding education, health care, and office expenses. ONHAE depends almost entirely on
those monies to function, and has no sustainable prospects for generating income after the
agreement expires. In 2001, ONHAE and six communities signed an agreement with Agip
for temporary assistance during exploratory drilling at Villano Norte (Block 10). Agree-
ment of Mutual Cooperation Between the Company Agip Oil Ecuador B.V., the Organiza-
tion of the Huaorani Nationality of the Ecuadorian Amazon (ONHAE), and the Communi-
ties of Tiweno, Tarangado, Damointado, Akaro (Tomo), Enquerido, y Quihuaro (Puyo,
Mar. 28,2001) [hereinafter Huaorani-Agip Agreement].
162. Huaorani Communication, supra note 161.
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[The spearing is] a product of processes of social inequalities, the ab-
sence of human rights, desperation, and the extreme conditions that
the Huaorani face because of the acoso petrolero, [oil company har-
assment]. In the Huaorani cosmo vision, death by spears means
having arrived at a situaci6n limite [unbearable situation] .... [The in-
cident] reflects the deterioration of the quality of life of our people,
our soledad [loneliness] before a society that does not have the time
or desire to see its surroundings, to help the most basic needs of the
human being in these days, [or] to refrain from exploiting the re-
sources of the land, of ome, without considering those who live in
her, and have protected and guarded her for centuries. 163
Traditionally, the Huaorani were nomadic hunters and gather-
ers. Renowned and feared as warriors who eschewed even trad-
ing contacts with outsiders, they used hardwood spears for hunt-
ing, defense, and vengeance when a family member died. Most
family groups were pacified in the 1960s and early 1970s by mis-
sionaries from the Summer Institute of Linguistics, in collabora-
tion with Texaco and the Ecuadorian government. The recent
spearing was carried out by a former president of ONHAE, born
after his family had been contacted by the missionaries. It was the
second spearing by contacted Huaorani of his generation.164 As a
general matter, oil development has thrust rapid change on the
Huaorani; they are clearly not at the center of concerns for devel-
opment in their territory. The spearing reflects how difficult it
remains for the Huaorani to adapt and guide their own destiny in
the changing world that accompanies oil development. 165
A subsequent agreement between the Italian TNC, Agip, and
ONHAE and six Huaorani communities provides for assistance to
163. Id.
164. The first was in 1994. Three colonists (a Shuar, his wife and their daughter) were
killed in their home, near a road built by Texaco in traditional Huaorani territory in the
1970s. The couple's son was wounded in the attack. The Huaorani blamed the colonists
for the death of a Huaorani baby; it reflected long-standing tensions between the Huaorani
and colonists in the vicinity of the road. Judith Kimerling, Dislocation, Evangelization and
Contamination: Amazon Crude and the Huaorani People in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND Gov-
ERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Latin America Program, Working Paper Series No. 215, 70-99 (1995).
165. This is true even for Huaorani who can speak Spanish and have had some experi-
ence in the outside world.
In another incident, uncontacted Huaorani speared two Quichua to death near the Cura-
ray River in November 2000. The Huaorani group, known as the Tagaeri, were displaced
by Texaco's operations in the 1970s. Id. The spearing was the third by the group since
1987, and suggests that they continue to feel threatened by encroachments in their territory,
not unrelated to the expansion of oil development and logging activities.
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the organization and communities during exploratory drilling in
the Block 10 area, but does not include "serious" environmental or
social consultation, controls or monitoring. 66 Indeed, in exchange
for the assistance, which is considerable-albeit temporary-by
Huaorani standards, ONHAE and the communities agreed to not
interrupt the work, and "give the needed facilities" to Agip to
build a drilling platform and flow line, and carry out exploratory
drilling and "any and all related activity, respecting the norms and
policies that Agip, its contractors and subcontractors establish" (em-
phasis supplied). 67
166. The community where the Petrocol spearing occurred is not among the beneficiar-
ies. For education, assistance includes: three monthly one-time donations to the school in
each community of rice, sugar (one quintal each), margarine (two tubs) and salt (one bag); a
one-time donation to each school of fifteen plates, cups and spoons, two pots and ladles,
two soccer balls, and one umpire's whistle, stopwatch, blackboard and Ecuadorian flag;
five days of training for six teachers; a monthly salary ($40 per month) for six teachers for
eight months; and construction of a school in one community (for a cost that may not ex-
ceed $3,500, including transportation of materials and labor). Huaorani-Agip Agreement,
supra note 161 at cls. 4.1-4.1.3.
For health care, assistance includes: a training course for six health promoters and three
months pay for the promoters ($25 per month), through ONHAE, after completing the
course; and, for each of the six communities, a medicine chest, up to $200 worth of medi-
cine selected by Agip's doctor, visits by medical brigades, coordination with government
agencies for fumigation to prevent malaria, and transportation for "duly proven" medical
emergencies. Id. at cis. 4.2-4.2.7.
For social programs, assistance includes: a radio for one community; a battery and solar
panel for existing radios in two communities; repair of the water system in one community,
for a cost that may not exceed $2,500, including transportation and materials; one delivery
of food and tools (to ONHAE) for maintenance of airstrips; and food rations for five
months for each of the 49 families in the six communities, comprised of twenty pounds of
rice, five pounds of sugar, two cans each of sardines and tuna, and one bag each of salt and
flour. Id. at cls 4.3-4.3.5.
For ONHAE, assistance includes: $1,000 for furniture or construction materials for the
office in Puyo; $200 per month for "operational activities" and $350 per month for air
transportation, with payments starting after construction of the platform begins and con-
tinuing until the end of the year; and one payment of $800 for land demarcation, to be paid
after construction of the platform begins. Id. at cls. 4.4-4.4.4.
167. Id. at cl. 4.5; see also cl. 3.1. The precise scope and duration of Agip's planned oil
field operations are vague. Cl. 4.5 refers to the platform, drilling and "related activities,"
but does not mention the flow line; however, cl. 3.1 includes "a flow line.. .within the right
of way." It is unclear why the pipeline is included in an agreement at the exploratory drill-
ing stage, because flow lines are generally used for production operations. It is also unclear
whether a "right of way" already exits, or whether Agip will build a new roadway for the
pipeline. See Id. at cl. 3.1. The Huaorani also agreed to control migration and settlements
by Huaorani in and toward the project area. Id. at cls. 4.8-4.9.
Previously, Block 10 was operated by ARCO, in a consortium with Agip. During
ARCO's tenure, operations there were promoted as a new model of responsible develop-
ment; at the same time, they provoked considerable controversy and division among some
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The agreement includes a statement of authorization for the
work by ONHAE and the six communities, but does not enter into
effect until after approval by Ecuador of Agip's budget and EIA.168
Presumably, then, the agreement was signed before completing
the EIA process. Despite the absence of a final EIA, the agreement
states that Agip has already "consulted" with affected communi-
ties over possible impacts of the project, as required by Ecuador's
Constitution and laws; said "consultation" took place on two
days, outside of Huaorani territory (in Puyo), with "delegates"
from the six communities and MEM's environmental unit, officials
of ONHAE, "members" of unnamed NGOs, and representatives
of Agip and the consultants hired by Agip to prepare the EIA.169
This suggests that the "consultations" did not begin until after Ec-
uador and Agip agreed on the scope and location of the opera-
tions; and that they were concluded without visiting affected
indigenous groups. Since acquiring ARCO's interest in 1999, Agip has maintained a lower
public profile.
Currently, however, Agip is involved in a high profile project to build a new trans-
Ecuadorian pipeline, known as the OCP pipeline (Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados). Construc-
tion is underway by a consortium of TNCs that produce oil in the region and the engineer-
ing company Techint SA of Argentina. In addition to Agip, the producers include Occiden-
tal, Repsol-YPF, Alberta Energy, Kerr-McGee, and Perez Companc. See EIA Ecuador
Country Analysis Brief, supra note 158.
In an apparent response to public attention and controversy, OCP has become the most
recent project to publicly pledge to use international standards and cutting edge technol-
ogy to protect the environment. See, e.g., Techint y OCP concretan firma (Techint and OCP
Sign,) Hoy (July 4, 2001); El petr6leo tiene 3 tipos de control (The Petroleum has 3 types of Con-
trol,) El Comercio (June 10, 2001) (all translations provided by the author). Despite those
claims, the pipeline will cross an area of significant seismic activity, where landslides and
oil spills (and possibly earthquakes) can likely be expected.
In addition to protests by environmentalists in Ecuador and Europe, the project has also
prompted the World Bank to respond to public statements by OCP and its German finan-
cier, WestLB, that the project "complies" with all applicable World Bank Standards. In a
letter to OCP, the Bank acknowledged the economic importance of the pipeline to Ecuador,
but expressed concern about being associated with the project. It "recommend[ed] that
OCP provide specific, independent verification of compliance with World Bank standards
or, alternatively, refrain from claiming any such compliance." Letter from Ian Johnson,
President & Head, Environmentally & Socially Sustainable Development, The World Bank,
and David De Ferranti, Vice President, Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, The
World Bank, to Dr. Heman Lara, Presidente Ejecutivo, Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados
(OCP) Ecuador (Dec. 19, 2001) (on fie with author). The Bank also expressed concern
about "serious environmental risks" posed by the pipeline to a biodiversity conservation
project supported by the Bank and Global Environment Facility (GEF) in the Choco-
Andean Corridor, "if [the pipeline is] constructed or operated in an inadequate manner."
Id.
168. Huaorani-Agip Agreement, supra note 161, at cls. 4.6; and 5.
169. Id. at cl. 2.3.
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communities, or disclosing the final EIA and environmental man-
agement plan (EMP) for the operations. The provision in the
agreement that addresses environmental standards and practices
for the operations is reminiscent of Occidental's legal strategy to
try to limit environmental norms to the standards and practices in
its EMP. It states that Agip agrees to comply with the norms that
are specified (and approved by the State) in the company's EIA
and EMP.170 However, there is no provision for review, approval,
or disclosure of the EIA or EMP to the Huaorani.' 7 '
In the Quichua comuna of Rio Tiputini, the U.S.-based TNC, Vin-
tage Petroleum, also tried to get residents to agree to oil field op-
erations in the absence of an EIA (and EMP). The company asked
the community to "authorize" the construction of a drilling plat-
form and access road for two new wells. In response, residents of-
fered to rent community lands to Vintage, but asked to review the
EIA for the operations before signing an agreement. In response,
the company said that it would not negotiate a rental agreement
with the comuna or agree to disclose the EIA; instead, it would se-
cure the expropriation of community lands by the State, to gain
access to the sites. Residents protested in a meeting with MEM's
environmental unit, but the government agency supported efforts
by Vintage to "force" the comuna to sign an agreement before even
a draft EIA had been reviewed by the community. 172
170. Id. at cl. 3.1.
171. In addition, the agreement includes an assumption of liability by ONHAE and the
six communities, and a release of liability by Agip, for damages to third parties or the envi-
ronment. Id. at cl. 8. The precise scope of that provision is ambiguous; arguably-but not
necessarily-it applies only to injuries caused by OHNAE and the communities. However,
there is no comparable assumption of liability by Agip for injuries that are caused by acts
or omissions of the company or its sub-contractors.
The provision to terminate the agreement is similarly one-sided. Termination results if
the Huaorani parties either do not comply or "unilaterally take measures of force against
Agip, its contractors or subcontractors;" but the agreement is silent with regard to viola-
tions or injuries by the companies, except for a general requirement to submit all disputes
regarding interpretation of or compliance with the agreement to the Arbitration Center of
the Chamber of Commerce in Ecuador's capital, Quito. Id. at cls. 9; and 10.
172. E-mail from Jon Arruti to Judith Kimerling, on behalf of Comuna Rio Tiputini (Feb.
2, 2002) [hereinafter Arruti email]. The existing wells were drilled by the French TNC, Elf
Aquitaine (now TotalFinaElf). Elf operated Block 14 before selling its interest to Vintage
Petroleum, Inc. in 1998 or 1999.
Vintage is based in Tulsa, Oklahoma. According to its 2000 Annual Report, which is
posted on the company's web page, the total average daily production in Ecuador during
the fourth quarter of 2000 was 3,000 barrels per day; plans call for increasing production
there to 17,000 barrels per day within a year of completion of the new OCP Pipeline. The
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Subsequently, the community contacted the author, requesting
information. They wanted to know whether Vintage is a French
or North American company, and how much oil is being extracted
from existing wells in community lands. They also asked for in-
formation so that they could (1) write a letter to the international
boss of Vintage, to advise him of their objection to expropriation,
and request that he send a new representative to negotiate a land
rental agreement; and (2) contact "a strong environmental or hu-
man rights organization" in France or the U.S., that could help
them prepare the letter and, if needed, distribute it publicly. 173
The comuna also took its grievance to the recent Congress of
FCUNAE, where the federation reportedly resolved to expel the
community relations officer who had offended the community
from the area.
In the Quichua community of Sarayacu, residents are also under
pressure to "agree" to oil development in their lands. In a recent
public statement, they complained about "acoso continuo," contin-
ual harassment by the Argentine company, Compania General de
Combustibles (CGC).174 Indigenous land titles in Ecuador typi-
cally state that land owners may not open "impede or obstruct"
oil or mining operations, and many communities believe that they
cannot say "no" to oil development. Some say they have signed
agreements with companies because they think that if they do not
sign, then the company will operate anyway, and residents will
not receive any economic benefit from the operations. 175 How-
ever, Sarayacu has long resisted the imposition of oil develop-
ment. As explained by one woman during a visit by the author:
"We have said again and again that we do not want oil companies
report states that a "planned drilling campaign" will "commence in a timely manner in or-
der to benefit from the increased infrastructure capacity to be created by the construction of
the recently approved 'OCP' oil export pipeline." VINTAGE PETROLEUM, INC., 2000
ANNUAL REPORT, 16, available at
http:/ /www.vintagepetroleum.com/download/Vintage2000AR.pdf. The new wells
slated for Rio Tiputini appear to be part of those plans; however, residents did not learn
about them until 2002, when Vintage tried to pressure them into authorizing the operations
discussed in the text.
173. Arruti email, supra note 172.
174. Declaration of Rejection and Resistance Against the Oil Company CGC from the
Community of Sarayacu in the Ecuadorian Amazon (Sept. 25, 2001) [hereinafter Sarayacu
Declaration].
175. See, e.g., Kimerling 2001b, supra note 22 at 234. The El Eden-Occidental Agreement
states that the community's land title "establishes that the Community may not oppose hy-
drocarbon activities in its territory." El Eden-Occidental Agreement, supra note 156 at cl.1.
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to work in our community. Why won't they listen?"176
Problems with CGC began in 1998, when the company surrepti-
tiously entered community lands. In 1999, community relations
officers from the company tried to curry favor in Sarayacu by
"buying off"community dirigentes, with a series of flights and fam-
ily visits to the town of Puyo. In an assembly, residents rejected
the company's overtures; then, CGC tried to bypass the political
organization of Sarayacu and influence families in the community
with "offers and manipulation." Those efforts created some con-
flict, but were nonetheless rejected by the community. 177
In 2000, CGC offered the community $60,000 and $160 per
month for 500 workers, but the offer was rejected in an assembly
attended by the company. Despite this, CGC has continued to
pressure families and individuals in Sarayacu. Outside the com-
munity, it reportedly began a "campaign of defamation" and cre-
ated a corporation comprised of selected indigenous and settler
organizations in the region, who are regarded in Sarayacu as
groups that are dominated by corrupt officials, not legitimate rep-
resentatives of local communities. 178 In the public statement,
Sarayacu denounced recent-and unrelenting-actions by CGC,
including payments to individuals "to spread pro-oil company
propaganda" and defame community leaders "for the purpose of
creating internal conflict and division that facilitate the entry of
the oil company," and financing a meeting in a neighboring com-
munity and inviting individuals from Sarayacu who are not le-
gitimate representatives, in an effort to make it appear that Saray-
acu had agreed to allow the company to operate. 79 The statement
closes with an appeal for moral support, and a commitment to
continue fighting for freedom from oil companies, peace, and a fu-
ture that echoes the core values of sustainable development:
We ask for solidarity and moral support from organizations, gov-
176. Meeting with Sarayacu Women's Association, Sarayacu, Ecuador, Aug. 3, 1999. In
addition to environmental and other social concerns, women in Sarayacu strongly oppose
oil development because they want to feel secure in their gardens and travel freely
throughout community lands without fear of encountering oil field workers (who are al-
ways male).
CGG operates the Block 23 area. Sarayacu is also crossed by Block 10; in 1989, the
community stopped ARCO from completing seismic studies there.
177. Sarayacu Jatun Mingay (n.d.) (received with correspondence from Association of
Indigenous Centers of Sarayacu to International Indian Treaty Council, Nov. 22, 2000.)
178. Id.
179. Id.
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ernments, and friends from around the world to defend our terri-
tory, at the same time defending the amazon forest and the global
environment.
We declare that any entry by the oil company in our territory, for us
will be an act of war, and we will take corresponding measures to
defend ourselves. Defending ourselves is not only our right, but
also our obligation to our children and future generations.
We want to liberate ourselves, once and for all, from the constant
threats of the oil companies, and in the end live in peace and tran-
quility, and be able to concentrate on the struggle to improve our
quality of life.180
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In Ecuador, the principles of sustainable development have
been incorporated into the highest law of the land, the Constitu-
tion. This is a significant step forward; however, for indigenous
peoples in Amazonia, the reforms will be empty unless concrete
action is taken to implement them. A decade after oil companies
first embraced sustainable development, some things are chang-
ing in the oil fields. But the companies are still firmly in control of
operations, including environmental and community relations
standards and practices. Voluntary initiatives have led some
TNCs to share some financial benefits with local communities, but
they are not undertaking development projects that are sustain-
able or sharing decision-making power, information and envi-
ronmental implementation with affected populations. Some com-
panies may be raising levels of environmental protection in some
areas, at least in the short term; however, this is not certain, and
needs independent verification and long-term monitoring. One
critical question that cannot be answered from the public record is
whether groundwater resources are protected from contamination
by waste injection activities and buried wastes and pipelines.181
180. Sarayacu Declaration, supra note 174.
181. Injection can increase the risk of groundwater contamination. As a result, it could
operate to lower levels of aquifer protection and create new problems, especially in deeper
strata. For buried wastes, some companies (including Occidental) now use synthetic liners
at new sites, but typically do not monitor groundwater. The impermeability of synthetic
liners may be compromised during manufacture or installation, and they degrade over
time; within thirty years, liners "turn to dust." Telephone Interview with Wilma Subra,
President, Subra Company, New Iberia, LA (May 19, 1999). Aging pipelines can also pre-
sent major long term threats to groundwater. Pipelines (including flow lines) are subject to
abrasion, corrosion and other stresses, and need systematic inspection, repair and rehabili-
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Ten years after Rio, a considerable gap remains between the
promise of sustainable development and the reality of develop-
ment in the oil fields. In many areas, residents are frustrated and
disappointed. As described by a local official in Block 15, "we are
always in protest, defense."
Despite Ecuador's promise at UNCED to implement national
law to protect the environment, the case study of Occidental re-
veals a radically new-and contradictory-development in envi-
ronmental law. Occidental and the government have quietly ne-
gotiated a legal framework that seems designed to perpetuate and
even legalize corporate control of environmental decision-making
and implementation. This is a clear affront to the principles of
sustainable development. It also raises serious questions of law,
legitimacy and accountability in Ecuador, and could operate to
undermine democracy, good governance and the rule of law, in
addition to presenting environmental and social risks.
As a general matter, the exclusive reliance on corporate self
regulation to protect the environment represents an abdication by
the State of one of its most basic responsibilities to its people. In
Ecuador, it is also legally dubious because it contradicts the gov-
ernment's constitutional and statutory duties; bypasses the na-
tional legislature; and effectively eviscerates the rights of indige-
nous communities and other Ecuadorians-under the
Constitution and international law-to participate in decisions
that affect them. Democracy and the rule of law mean many
things to many people, but surely they do not mean that the
power to write environmental law can be properly delegated to
foreign corporations, based on negotiations between special inter-
ests and a small group of officials from a distrusted political class.
Nor should they mean that the land rights of indigenous peoples
can be unilaterally extinguished by those officials, at the behest of
those interests.
There is no question that corporate responsibility and other vol-
untary initiatives are needed to raise levels of environmental pro-
tection in oil field operations in Ecuador and throughout Amazo-
tation to prevent spills and leakage. Many companies (including Occidental) now bury
most pipelines; this practice reduces the risk of accidental spills due to collisions with mo-
tor vehicles. However, it can increase the risk of spills due to failures in the integrity of the
pipeline system, and reduce the ability of companies to detect leaks and prevent spills by
making inspection and repair considerably more difficult and expensive. For a fuller dis-
cussion, see Kimerling 2001a, supra note 22 at 381-90.
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nia. At the same time, however, they are not without peril. In the
decade since UNCED, the promise of "corporate responsibility,"
"best practice" and "international standards" has become a tool
that TNCs can use to dominate environmental information, deci-
sion-making and implementation; deflect and discourage mean-
ingful oversight; rebuff and belittle grievances by affected resi-
dents; and paint a veneer of environmental excellence and social
responsibility to camouflage business as usual. In addition, they
can operate to undermine the development of national environ-
mental law and capacity in developing nations, by arbitrarily le-
gitimizing norms that have been defined by special interests, and
reassuring government officials and other stakeholders that stan-
dards and practices are improving.
Experience in Ecuador shows that international standards can-
not be divorced from the social, economic, and political context in
which they operate. At the same time, however, a major source of
potential abuse can be linked to the widespread confusion, out-
side of industry circles, about the source and substance of appli-
cable norms. Ten years after Rio, the international community can
act to address that problem, by developing transparent and par-
ticipatory mechanisms to independently evaluate and verify envi-
ronmental claims by TNCs at specific locations.182
182. Those mechanisms should: (1) clearly identify applicable standards, and their
source; (2) verify compliance with applicable standards; (3) evaluate the effectiveness of
standards by measuring environmental performance in concrete terms; (4) identify meas-
ures and standards that could be used to raise environmental protection levels and repair
damages; (5) develop transparent and credible monitoring and review protocols that could
be implemented, for the most part, by national residents and officials, including local
communities, throughout the life of the project; and (6) include a public outreach and edu-
cation program that invites government officials, residents, environmentalists, and other
interested members of the public to participate in the review, and ensures that the findings
and recommendations can serve as meaningful tools for environmental education. Two
measures will be needed to enhance the credibility of the reviews: (1) the team conducting
the review should include experts that have been selected by local communities and envi-
ronmentalists, in addition to industry and government experts; and (2) the work of the
group must be transparent, and its findings recorded and justified.
By reviewing operations at specific locations, this type of participatory audit would
promote meaningful international standards by helping to move the discourse from vague
generalities to concrete measures. The audits would respond directly to the real world
needs of residents who are concerned about the impact of operations in their communities,
but feel overpowered by TNCs, neglected by their government, and without anywhere to
turn for assistance or relief. Participatory audits could also help promote the development
of national environmental law and democratic decision-making in countries like Ecuador,
by nurturing and informing a dialogue, in concrete terms, between government officials,
[Vol. 27:2
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At the same time, governments need to recognize that excessive
dependence on voluntary self regulation is not sound environ-
mental policy for industrial natural resource development. De-
spite the burgeoning corporate discourse about environmental
and social responsibility, what governs industry standards in real-
ity are the private needs and interests of the companies, and their
concern for the bottom line. Ironically, it is the failure of interna-
tional oil companies to regulate themselves in remote areas-and
the abysmal track record of the industry generally-that has led to
widespread agreement about the need for international oil field
standards. To ensure that international environmental and social
standards are effective, corporate responsibility needs to be bind-
ing, not merely voluntary.183 The use of the rule of law to promote
residents, TNCs and other stakeholders about environmental standards and oversight.
This would further serve to help governments implement international - and perhaps also
national as in Ecuador - law commitments to guarantee the participation of indigenous
peoples and affected residents in environmental decision-making and implementation.
Finally, the audits offer a concrete mechanism to continually improve environmental stan-
dards and performance at many locations in the developing world, and would help inform
the international trade debate.
183. One important finding of the case study-that adequate information is not avail-
able to independently evaluate the effectiveness of Occidental's voluntary environmental
initiative-is consistent with findings of studies of voluntary approaches to environmental
protection in industrial countries. Although not without considerable controversy, it is fre-
quently argued that cooperative approaches are more cost effective than traditional "com-
mand and control" regulation, and better able to promote innovation and sustained efforts
by corporations to improve environmental performance and go beyond compliance with
formal requirements.
A number of policy instruments have been developed under the general rubric of "co-
operative approaches," including voluntary codes and agreements. K. Harrison, Talking
with the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to Environmental Protection, 2 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 51
(1999). Despite this, even in Europe and the U.S., very little is known about the effective-
ness of those initiatives. EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (EEA), ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS (1997); and Harrison, supra. In a review of
the literature, Harrison concludes:
The one clear area of consensus among studies of voluntary approaches is that there
has been too little attention to evaluation of either economic or environmental benefits
[citations omitted]. In part, this reflects the novelty of voluntary approaches; it is sim-
ply too early to assess the effectiveness in many cases. However, it also reflects a pa-
thology of unclear targets and inattention to the kinds of monitoring, verification, and
public reporting needed to support program evaluation.
Harrison, supra at 66.
In Block 15, it is too soon to fully evaluate the effectiveness of Occidental's initiative be-
cause the scope of operations, and impacts, continue to expand, and because many envi-
ronmental risks can be expected to increase over time. However, enough time has passed
to allow some review of environmental performance; despite this, the absence of clear and
transparent standards, monitoring, verification and public reporting make it impossible to
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and impose oil development, but not to control and remedy the
injuries it causes, is fundamentally unfair and reflects and rein-
forces inequities in law and governance. Ten years after Rio, the
time has come to address those inequities and implement mean-
ingful-and transparent-regulation of oil companies, that in-
cludes comprehensive environmental planning, strict controls,
long-term monitoring, accountability, public participation, and ef-
fective grievance procedures and remedies.
In addition, both the case study and snapshots from other Ama-
zonian communities show that the principle of free, prior and in-
formed consent needs to be applied in the oil fields, to protect and
promote the rights of indigenous peoples in the development
process. In effect, TNCs (and host governments) already exercise
this right when they negotiate agreements, as do landowners in
many other locations. Similarly, when corporations (and govern-
ments) enter into partnerships, they do so voluntarily.
Both equity and concern for human welfare are core values of
sustainable development. The preamble of the Rio Declaration af-
firms that the goal of UNCED is to establish a "new and equitable
global partnership" for environmental protection and develop-
ment; Principle 1 proclaims that "[hiuman beings are at the center
of concerns for sustainable development... ."184 The imposition
of alien models of development on indigenous populations
against their wishes is unconscionable. Moreover, equitable part-
nerships for development by oil companies in indigenous com-
munities will require legal rights and protections that are equita-
ble. Ten years after Rio, governments need to recognize and
respect the right of indigenous peoples to be voluntary-rather
than forced-"partners" with business in their communities, and
ensure that their free, prior and informed consent is obtained be-
fore companies undertake industrial natural resource develop-
ment in their territory. Corporations need to recognize that-as
stated by the Indigenous Peoples Caucus in preparatory meetings
for the Rio + 10 summit to review progress towards sustainable
do so independently. This suggests that, although voluntary initiatives in the developing
world are different in many ways from voluntary approaches in industrial countries, due
to the fundamentally different political, social and economic contexts in which they oper-
ate, they can - and Occidental's initiative does - nonetheless reflect some of the same basic
deficiencies: the lack of clear targets and adequate monitoring, performance evaluation,
and transparency.
184. Rio Declaration, supra note 3.
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development-"indigenous peoples are rights-holders not mere
stakeholders."185
Similarly, the expropriation of indigenous lands for industrial
natural resource development should not be permitted, because it
is unilateral and heavy-handed. In addition to extinguishing the
land rights of indigenous peoples, it threatens to eviscerate their
emerging participatory rights. Taking lands when they become
commercially valuable undermines both the claim of local popula-
tions to a share of the profits and their right to participate in deci-
sion-making. In negotiations, it tips the scale unfairly against lo-
cal residents. Companies can use the threat of expropriation to
pressure people to sign agreements quickly and abandon de-
mands that are problematic, such as requirements for environ-
mental norms and community monitoring. Expropriation can also
be used to impose oil development on unwilling communities, by
making their views unimportant and even irrelevant. Regardless
of whether local residents welcome or oppose oil development,
expropriation makes it easy (at least in the short term) for compa-
nies and governments to disregard their rights in the development
process, and shut them out of decisions that affect them.186
For the rule of law to serve as an instrument of justice, the rules
must be fair. When rules are inequitable, the rule of law can be an
instrument of aggression, rather than democracy, and best prac-
tice by TNCs can foster destruction, rather than development. To
continue to subject native peoples to the reach and logic of global
markets without equal rights and protection of the law is unfair.
Moreover, until governments uphold the land and cultural rights
of indigenous peoples, including the right to say "no" to oil com-
panies without losing their land, the kinds of abusive practices
that are still going on in Ecuador-ten years after Rio-can be ex-
pected to continue, and the right of indigenous peoples to partici-
pate in development in their communities will remain elusive.
185. Statement of Indigenous Peoples to Working Group 2 - Multi-Stakeholder Proc-
esses (Jan. 29, 2002). The UN-sponsored summit to review progress on implementation of
the UNCED agreements after ten years is officially named the World Summit on Sustain-
able Development, and is scheduled for Aug. 26 - Sept. 4, 2002, in Johannesburg, South Af-
rica.
186. In addition, expropriation undermines the legitimacy of governments in the eyes of
indigenous peoples; makes it easier for companies to deflect environmental oversight by
affected communities; and could be used to try to limit liability to local residents for pollu-
tion. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling 2001b, supra note 22.
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The consent and participation of indigenous peoples in develop-
ment activities are essential to their well-being, and to the realiza-
tion of sustainable development. Both forced development and
expropriation in indigenous territories are clearly at odds with the
values of sustainable development, which place people and equity
at the center of concerns. Addressing those legal inequities would
be a significant step forward towards addressing the power ineq-
uities that currently characterize industrial natural resource de-
velopment; new proclamations in the absence of legal rights and
protections that are equitable would be window-dressing.
Finally, oil and gas development in Amazonia should not be
confused with sustainable development. As a general matter, oil
and gas development is sustained, but it is not sustainable; and
the primary engine sustaining it is energy consumption in the in-
dustrial world. As a result, the future of sustainable development
in the oil fields of Amazonia lies not only in the hands of corpora-
tions, governments, indigenous peoples and NGOs, but also with
everyone in the industrial world. We, too, are actors in the oil
fields. Ten years after Rio, we all need to participate in achieving
sustainable development; in the U.S., we can begin by recognizing
our role in sustaining the environmental and social costs of oil
consumption, and by acting as individuals and a nation to imple-
ment another key principle of the Rio Declaration, which calls for
reducing and eliminating unsustainable patterns of consump-
tion. 187
187. See Rio Declaration, supra note 3, at prin. 8.
The U.S. consumes more than twenty-five percent of the world's petroleum products,
43.6 percent as gasoline. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration
(EIA), Table 3.5, World Apparent Consumption of Refined Petroleum Products, 1998, avail-
able at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/table35.html. Oil consumption also helps make
the U.S. the world's largest single source of anthropogenic (human-caused) greenhouse gas
emissions, believed to contribute to global climate change. The primary greenhouse gas
emitted by human activities is carbon dioxide, released into the atmosphere when oil and
other fossil fuels are burned. With less than 5 percent of the world's population and the
world's largest economy, the U.S. emits 24.7 percent of global carbon emissions (1,519 mil-
lion metric tons of carbon), mainly in the form of carbon dioxide.
The transportation sector is responsible for 32 percent of U.S. carbon emissions, and the
popularity of sports utility vehicles, minivans, and light trucks-which are less fuel effi-
cient than cars-is one reason why emissions have increased since UNCED, notwithstand-
ing a voluntary goal under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to stabilize
greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. See U.S. Department of Energy,
EIA, Country Analysis Briefs, United States of America, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/usa2.htm (last modified Oct. 25,2001); and UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, supra note 3 at art. 4(2)(a)-(b). The figures reported by EIA
[Vol. 27:2
Sustainable Development in Amazonia
In the meantime, in the Amazon Rainforest, the potential envi-
ronmental, social and cultural costs of continued experimentation
with industrial "sustainable" development are high. At best, the
jury is still out on whether oil companies can extract oil and gas
from a fragile rainforest environment without serious injury; the
track record of the industry to date suggests that they cannot.
Moreover, the cumulative impact of expanding oil, gas and inter-
national pipeline projects throughout Amazonia has not been
adequately assessed. No new oil and gas development should go
forward in Amazonia until the industry has credibly demon-
strated-by action at existing facilities rather than plans for future
ones-that it can honor promises to protect the environment and
respect local cultures. At least some areas-including protected
areas, swamps and flooded forests-should be off-limits to indus-
try. The territories of uncontacted and isolated indigenous peo-
ples should also be off-limits, and contacted communities that
want a different model of development should have the right to
make that choice. Environmentalists who want indigenous com-
munities to say "no" to oil development need to work with those
communities to find alternative ways to generate income and
achieve culturally appropriate sustainable development. Compa-
nies that want them to say "yes" need to take transparency and
community participation seriously, and help address the current
inequities in access to information and technical assistance.
When oil exploration and production go forward in indigenous
territories, voluntary initiatives and corporate responsibility offer
great promise for needed improvements. But they are not a pana-
cea that can replace the need for government regulation and pub-
lic participation, as recognized-and promised-at the Earth
Summit. As a general matter, for international standards and cor-
porate responsibility to play a constructive role in trade and de-
velopment, reliably raise environmental standards, and help na-
tions like Ecuador strengthen democratic institutions and develop
environmental law, then, at a minimum, the applicable standards
for total carbon emissions are 1999 estimates; the transportation sector share is the 1998 es-
timate.
Other sectoral shares are: industrial with 32.6 percent; residential with 19.4 percent; and
commercial with 16 percent. EIA, Country Analysis Briefs, United States of America, supra.
Between 1990 and 2000, U.S. releases of greenhouse gases rose by more than 12 percent.
Andrew Revkin, Climate Plan is Criticized as a Risky Bet, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 26,
2002).
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must be clear and transparent, and their effectiveness independ-
ently verified, with community involvement, in the light of the
day.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Talks on agriculture at the World Trade Organization (WTO)
are about to enter a new phase. In the next few months, represen-
tatives will agree on a negotiating framework and launch discus-
sions to revise the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(AoA). Although this review was already required under the
AoA, governments decided at the WTO Ministerial Conference in
Doha last year to tie the outcome of these negotiations to other ar-
eas, for joint completion by 2005.
The framework of the AoA provides a structure many trade ne-
gotiators find pleasing. It gives them room to fight over market
access and levels of domestic and export support. This framework
is the most frequently cited positive outcome of the AoA. The ar-
gument goes: while the AoA has failed to curb spending on
agriculture in OECD countries and has failed to end export
dumping, it has at least provided a basis for further negotiations
that could eventually end government-created distortions in
world agricultural markets.
Despite this warm endorsement of the framework, however,
there has been little progress in the talks on agriculture. The
member states show marked differences among their positions.
The Cairns Group, an association of developed and developing
* Sophia Murphy works for the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Minneapolis.
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countries with large agricultural export interests, continues to
push for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies, substan-
tially increased market access, including deep tariff cuts, and ma-
jor reductions in production-distorting domestic support.' The
U.S. claims to be sympathetic to the Cairns Group, but has contin-
ued to increase its domestic support levels, in defiance of the spirit
of the AoA. In 2000, the U.S. spent approximately $23 billion on
agricultural programs.2 Meanwhile, Japan has proposed reversing
many of the disciplines adopted under the AoA.
The E.U., Japan, Norway, South Korea, and Switzerland, to-
gether with a few other countries, have raised non-trade concerns
as a central part of their negotiating positions. Non-trade concerns
include food security and environmental protection. In practice,
related programs include payments to farmers for good land
stewardship practices and for humane treatment of animals. The
policies have come to be known collectively as multifunctional ag-
riculture. The U.S., together with Australia and Argentina in par-
ticular, but also with many developing countries, has rejected the
concept. The debate has created a clear fault line in the continuing
discussions.
Developing countries do not share a unified position. Some de-
veloping countries belong to the Cairns Group, where many of
them are open to discussions on how to protect food security and
other non-trade concerns, as long as they are restricted to develop-
ing countries only.
Fifteen or so developing countries have formed a loose affilia-
tion called the Like Minded Group. The members share an inter-
est in increasing their agricultural exports, but they are also look-
ing for measures to control unwanted imports of dumped
produce from world markets. The Like Minded Group has also
articulated proposals that would better protect food security and
the livelihoods of low-income farmers.
Small island developing countries, such as Mauritius and many
of the Caribbean states, form yet another group of developing
1. There are currently eighteen members of the Cairns Group: Argentina, Australia, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. See
http://www.caimsgroup.org/members.hmtl.
2. Environmental Working Group Farm Subsidy Database, (1996-2000), at
http://gsi.ewg.org/farmbiH.acgi$farmbill?regtype=country&submitted=true&whichForm
=reg.
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countries. This group is concerned that their dependence on one
or two commodities for export revenues forces them to rely on
unstable world prices. These countries have been hurt by changes
in the terms of preferential access to European markets under the
Cotonou Agreement; 3 many of them are not able to compete at
low prevailing world commodity prices.
This profusion of views reflects the impossibility of isolating
trade from other areas of policy. The agreement allows countries
some leeway to determine the support measures they want for
their agricultural sectors. Unlimited spending is allowed for pro-
grams that support low income and resource poor farmers in de-
veloping countries. All countries are allowed unlimited spending
on insurance programs, infrastructure provision, and public food
stocks. In practice, these exemptions represent billions of dollars
of expenditure in Europe and the United States and reflect how
intertwined domestic and international policies are in relation to
agriculture.
Trade is not inimical to sustainable production systems. Trade is
a tool that allows production to be concentrated in areas where
the natural conditions and available resources are most suitable,
while ensuring broad distribution of that production. However,
the management of international trade poses two kinds of chal-
lenges for public policymakers interested in ensuring sustainable
practices. The first comes from market distortions that inhibit
market forces from maximizing efficient resource use, and the
second comes from market failures that require public policy in-
terventions if public welfare is to be protected.
II. MARKET DISTORTIONS: ARE WTO RULES ON TRACK?
Some of the existing WTO disciplines target important sources
of distortion in agricultural markets that undermine sustainability.
Export subsidies have contributed significantly to the sale of food
at less than cost of production prices on world markets, diminish-
ing developing countries' development potential and pushing
small farmers and traders out of their local markets. Export subsi-
3. The Cotonou Agreement is the most recent iteration of the Partnership Agreement
between the European Union and countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP
countries). The Cotonou Agreement, The European Commission, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm./development/cotonou/agreementen.htm.
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dies and poorly designed domestic support programs have in-
creased the market power of transnational grain, processing and
retailing companies at the expense of producers around the world.
Tariff barriers discriminate against value-added processing, dis-
courage badly needed investment in developing countries, and
perpetuate existing trade patterns that favor a handful of devel-
oped countries over the rest of the world.
Nonetheless, existing agricultural trade rules are far from ade-
quate in addressing the extent of distortions. The global food pro-
duction and marketing system is highly concentrated. Chemical
companies (which now dominate the seed business too) are linked
to grain traders and food processors through vertically integrated
alliances. The same companies buy, ship and mill grain, then feed
it to livestock or turn it into cereal, often crossing several national
borders in the process. Although trade negotiators have focused
on payments to producers as the problem, examination of domes-
tic support programs in the U.S. show how the subsidies actually
go to transnational agribusinesses, who benefit from cheap sup-
plies for their shipping, processing, and livestock feed operations.4
The globalized food system is managed by a relatively small
number of private firms. These firms are enormous. For example,
Cargill, the largest private company in the world, had annual
sales in 2001 of US$ 49,408 million.5 These companies and"their
practices are at least as significant as the public policies that affect
agricultural production and international agricultural trade, not
least because of their influence on the public policies in question,
yet the impact of their market power is ignored in multilateral
trade rules.
Another market distortion encouraged by the AoA occurs
through the sanction of unlimited decoupled payments to pro-
ducers. These are payments from governments to farmers that are
related to historical rather than current production levels and
crops. The argument is that by cutting the link to current produc-
tion choices, the trade-distorting impact of the payments is mini-
4. A 1998 survey of farm records for southwest Minnesota found that average net farm
income was $8,616. The corresponding government subsidy was $ 30,000. The money does
not stay on the farm. Kent Olson, Mixed News from 1998 Farm Records, 696 MINN. AGRIC.
ECONOMIST NEWSL. (1999), available at
http: //www.extension.umn.edu/newsletters/ageconomist/components/ag237-696a.html.
5. CARGILL, INCORPORATED AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIALHIGHLIGHTS 1997-
2001, available at http/ /www.cargill.com/finance/highlights.htm.
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mized. In practice, the declining levels of farm income, the low
prices plaguing all commodities, and the desire to maintain pro-
duction in areas that historically have been supported have all in-
hibited much shift in production. For many crops, production has
increased in the face of declining prices. Since payments are tied
to land use and farming is so unprofitable, landowners keep their
land but look for others to farm it. In 1997, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture found forty-one percent of U.S. agricultural land was
rented out, and the trend was increasing.6
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION
FOR SUSTAINABILITY
The AoA has implications for agricultural production systems
beyond rules and exemptions. The agreement is premised on the
idea that the fewer the trade barriers, the easier it is to meet de-
mand for food at a fair price for producers.
This assumption ignores the question of purchasing power-
millions of people do not have enough money to access the food
they need on the market. It ignores dietary preferences-many of
the primary sources of calories for people across the planet are not
sold in global markets; in fact, much of the food sold in world
markets is destined for animal feed. The assumption ignores the
importance of agriculture in providing livelihoods-an estimated
seventy percent of the world's population depends on growing
and selling food for their livelihood.7
The AoA rules also ignore important ecological considerations.
With the spread of industrial models of agriculture, genetic diver-
sity is on the wane. Many of the remarkable production increases
in agriculture over the last fifty years have come through focusing
production on a small number of plant and animal varieties that
have specific attributes-for example, greater yield per plant or a
higher lean to fat meat ratio in livestock. Although this has kept
supplies of food plentiful in the face of a growing population, it
has also created problems by diminishing our genetic resource
6. G. Wunderlich, U.S. Farmland Ownership: A Century of Change, AGRic. OUTLOOK, Dec.
1993, at 3.
7. Food and Agriculture Organization of The United Nations Secretariat, Some Issues
Relating to Food Security in the Context of the WTO Negotiations on Agriculture, presented at
Round Table On Food Security In The Context Of The WTO Negotiations On Agriculture
(July 20, 2001), at 3, available at http://www.fao.org/trade/docs/notelfinal_en.doc.
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base. "The best available information indicates that currently ap-
proximately 30 percent of all livestock breeds are at risk of extinc-
tion. Loss of animal genetic resources has been the greatest in de-
veloped countries, which have often concentrated on a few high-
input breeds to the detriment of their locally adapted breeds." 8
Given that we face constant uncertainty, related to changing
weather and climate patterns, the emergence of new pests, and
unprecedented levels of contact between even the most remote
places, the protection of our genetic diversity is central to ensuring
sustainable development.
A neo-classical approach to regulating trade in agriculture also
ignores some fundamentals about agricultural production and
consumption. Demand in agriculture is relatively inelastic. Since
people must eat to live, they spend as much as necessary on ob-
taining a basic caloric intake. Once sated, however, food is of little
interest, no matter how low prices may go. Production is also ine-
lastic. Supply is very much dependent on the weather. Over
ninety percent of global rice production depends on the same
monsoon system. China's average wheat production is equivalent
to all the wheat traded in international markets. World markets
tend to be residual-even the most heavily traded crops (except a
few tropical commodities such as coffee) only trade about thirty
percent of production over national borders. Only eighteen per-
cent of wheat and six percent of rice is traded internationally.
This means that bad weather in a few countries makes an enor-
mous difference to the supply of food available from international
markets. Physical stocks are essential to compensate for produc-
tion shortfalls and to keep a steady supply of food at affordable
prices available.9
Multilateral trade rules for agriculture are essential. Our world
is too interdependent for countries not to take responsibility for
the impact of their policies on others. Countries are the result of
historical and geographical accidents, not the careful creation of
agriculturalists. Therefore, not all countries have ideal conditions
to meet all food requirements within national borders. However,
8. Food and Agriculture Organization of The United Nations, The Role of Biological Di-
versity in Feeding the World, at http://www.fao.org/biodiversity/sd/foodsecur.asp (last
visited Mar. 26,2002).
9. Economic Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Agr., Briefing Room, Rice: Background, at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/rice/background.htm (last updated June 28,2001).
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to ensure that international trade plays a positive role in ensuring
food security, protecting our environment, and creating liveli-
hoods, it is essential that trade rules respect the characteristics that
distinguish agriculture from other sectors. The review of the Uru-
guay Round Agreement on Agriculture is a chance to improve
what we have; let us hope governments seize it.

